

BALTIC SECURITY, NATO AND THE EU

Edited by Tomas Ries and Karoliina Honkanen

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ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF FINLAND

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**Contributions to the Seminar on “Baltic Security, NATO and the EU”
arranged by the Atlantic Council of Finland in Helsinki on 19-20
October 2001**

SUOMEN ATLANTTI-SEURA RY
THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF FINLAND

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PREFACE

There are very few issues that preoccupy the minds of the citizens around the Baltic Sea to the same degree as integration. The negotiations on the enlargement of the European Union are progressing. At the same time NATO is considering to whom it would next year issue an invitation to join the alliance. Both processes have a bearing upon the security of all countries around the Baltic Sea, not just on the security of the candidate countries. Finland joined the European Union already in 1995 but her relationship vis-a-vis NATO is still an open question. A lively debate is going on among the politicians, the journalists and the research community.

What others will do is an important matter also for Finland. An enlarged European Union with the Baltic states and Poland as members would change not only the economics and the politics of the region but would also have an impact on the overall security in the north. An enlarged NATO would change the security environment for Finland and Sweden, the two countries in the region that have not joined the alliance. There are in other words very important reasons why Finns should understand better the thinking and the intentions of the states around the Baltic Sea, Russia, of course, included.

The Atlantic Council of Finland felt that a seminar on "Baltic Security, NATO and the EU" would be one possibility for improving that understanding. The organisers of the seminar are grateful to the one hundred participants from the various countries around the Baltic Sea and to NATO who gave their contributions to the proceedings of the seminar. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland gave their valuable support. Nordea banking group and Patria Industries were the principal sponsors from the private sector. We owe them a debt of gratitude.

What ever decisions are taken in the issues of membership in EU or in NATO, the main thing is that such decisions are based on an informed debate and they have the support of the citizens in the candidate countries as well as in the present member countries. Informed public opinion can only be created if the main issues are identified and presented to the general public in a clear and comprehensible way. If this seminar has helped in achieving that end, it has fulfilled its purpose.

Helsinki, December 3rd, 2001

Ambassador Jaakko Itoniemi
Chairman of the Atlantic Council of Finland 1999-2001

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EDITORIAL NOTE

The world is moving rapidly, and the priority of the editorial team has been to publish the results of the seminar as quickly as possible, before they were entirely overtaken by events! This publication includes all of the presentations and most of the workshop contributions. However unfortunately some of the latter were not delivered by the deadline and are not included. We believe that the thrust and flavour of the seminar and the workshops nevertheless remains intact.

Karoliina Honkanen and Tomas Ries

PRESENTATIONS

REMARKS

Jaakko Laajava

Thank you very much for inviting me to address this important seminar. I would like to commend your valuable activities to promote knowledge about transatlantic matters.

I will devote the beginning of my remarks to questions regarding the fight against terrorism and later touch upon a few topics on the transatlantic future agenda.

The events of September 11 are perhaps still too close to attempt any analysis of their longer-term impact. We have observed a number of important developments but it is perhaps too early to say very much about their consequence as to the whole international system.

In any case, September 11 again highlighted the immense importance of the close and well-functioning transatlantic partnership

As the EU leaders stated right after the terrorist attacks, this was not only an attack against the US but an attack on our free, tolerant and multicultural societies as well. NATO evoked Article 5 as its basis for further action: there was a strong European message of solidarity with America.

I believe this strong message was important in many ways. Had there been a slightest wavering on the European side about the need to engage in resolute action, would the U.S. have turned to the United Nations Security Council and sought legitimation for its and the coalition's anti-terrorist activities, including the military campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taleban that supported it?

I believe that, at least partially, the strong show of transatlantic solidarity made the U.S. feel confident that a broader, indeed almost global coalition against terrorism was achievable. There were no illusions because everyone understood that if you want increased legitimacy, you will get an increasingly complicated agenda as well. Coalitions tend to prove fragile in the longer run even if they seem firm and coherent in the beginning.

The fight against terrorism takes place in many different forms, not only military. It is in fact very difficult to forecast what the future will look like. We know that the fight against terrorism will take a long time and require a determined joint effort by all.

One of the interesting developments after September 11 have been the responses by Russia and China. They have provided important support to this common cause. Is there a chance now to reshape, at least to some extent, the dynamics of our international system?

The response against terrorism by Europe and NATO may also have an important bearing on the future of transatlantic relations as well.

I assume that other speakers today concentrate on the future of the Alliance itself. Let me therefore take up a couple of points of a more general nature regarding important trends in European-American relations – and let me do so from the EU perspective and present to you not a theoretical but a practitioner's view.

My first observation concerns the changing nature of the transatlantic economic relationship. We all know that this economic relationship is by far the most important in the world. I will not cite any numbers, but when we look at the totality of our economic interaction, it consists today of many more things than just trade. It is a complex trading and investment environment with huge intra-company trade and intra-industry mergers and acquisitions.

What we actually witness here is the process of globalization at its very maximum: our economies do not only trade with each other, they invest heavily in each other, our economies are actually integrating, it is increasingly a Daimler-Chrysler story, it is very difficult to distinguish any longer what constitutes a European entity and what American; businesses operate worldwide and most operate actively in the transatlantic area as well.

At the same time, formally speaking, we Europeans and Americans behave like just two normal WTO trading partners. Obviously we also want to act like this: it is very important indeed to us that Europe and America try to promote the credibility of the multilateral trading system, a system based on jointly negotiated and adopted rules.

However, the reality of transatlantic economic relations is that we find ourselves quite often in a deep controversy, grand disputes emerge that have a bearing on our entire relationship, including the political and security dimension.

It is of course true that in view of the huge scale of our transactions, and the fact that we indeed are competitors, divergences of views are bound to surface. And indeed, over the years, many disputes have plagued our relationship, including such as the banana war. We have many divergences of view regarding GMOs and many other important issues as well.

The problem is that, in the future, we should expect even more serious disputes as well, disputes that are of a cultural character and inherently difficult to manage. Our values are basically the same on both sides of the Atlantic but the hierarchies of them do not necessarily coincide. A good example is to be found in environmental matters: attitudes regarding their urgency and position on the agenda simply differ.

This may only be the beginning. There are many new emerging issues stemming, e.g. from advanced biotechnology, advanced biomedicine and other areas. These bring important ethical, political and cultural questions to the

limelight. How do we manage them? European and American attitudes may well lead to increased differences among us. How do we handle such things? Do we have an appropriate mechanism to do that?

What we of course know that we must avert a situation where these important cultural and ethical issues begin to overshadow the entire transatlantic system making it more and more shaky and vulnerable.

There are no easy answers to these problems.

As things are now, we just routinely take our differences to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, DSM. After all, it is basically our own creation and we have a permanent interest to uphold its authority.

This is fine, but is the DSM up to the task? I believe the mechanism was originally created to solve essentially smaller-scale issues between nation states, not gigantic trade disputes. Yes, the DSM is an important tool to foster the philosophy of rules-based international trading system and is actually intended to be used particularly among developing nations who do not necessarily have other means to solve their disputes. But when we, Europeans and Americans, go there with our huge and politically explosive problems, do we help things or do we actually saturate the whole mechanism with our issues? Is this appropriate? Couldn't we find other ways? What is the message to the developing nations? Is the DSM really designed to solve problems of that magnitude or is it rather becoming a test bed for our skillful lawyers' innovativeness? Should we indeed teach the lesson to our developing nation partners that – look – by doing this and that lawyerly tricks and evasive manoeuvres you can actually avoid being sanctioned if you behave badly?

At the same time, we should ask ourselves: can one really “win” a trade case in the mutually dependent European-American economic environment? The reality of our economies is that they are increasingly integrated: can you really put meaningful sanctions to the other party without at the same time harming yourself in the complex network of mutual ownerships and multifaceted interests across the Atlantic?

Realistically, any improvements here will take a very long time. Therefore, any preparations for such changes should be initiated without delay. Nothing will be easy.

I think a certain amount of new thinking is required in areas of security and security policy as well.

I leave aside the Alliance's today's practical concerns: interoperability, capabilities and the ESDP where work is going on.

In a broader context of the entire world it is clear that Europe and the U.S. share the same fundamental interest in stability, security and increasing prosperity. First, stability and growth are in our own immediate interest: when trade and

investments flow efficiently, our economies will prosper. Second, I believe that it is in our own interest that developing nations will increasingly be able to participate and benefit from the process of globalization. In this, they need our assistance.

It is easy to find points for criticism. Many mistakes have indeed been made in all this. However, the fact is that the U.S. has provided important leadership in this effort. It has tried to avoid the perception of hegemonism which would make everything much more difficult.

At the same time, Europe, too, is becoming stronger. It has increasingly global interests and a global outreach. An enlarged EU with its significant resources and interests cannot avoid its leadership role and responsibility in the world.

The European Union is largely perceived lately as an institution focusing mainly on the consolidation of the process of integration and the launch of the euro. However, important new things regarding Europe's outward-looking approach are emerging. The case in point is the Union's crisis management capacity and the development of the European Security and Defense Policy, the ESDP.

Europe is increasingly ready and willing to contribute in various ways to the broader trans-atlantic security environment: in so doing, it does not seek to duplicate nor replace NATO but to strengthen it.

Is the EU ready to face global challenges?

I see this as a longer-term process.

I am convinced that, gradually, Europe will be increasingly ready to shoulder its global responsibilities. We of course understand that we are as dependent, as vulnerable as Americans, our interests are at stake when we are dealing with matters of stability, security and the growth of prosperity in the world.

The fundamental fact is that our democratic societies must proceed in this in a manner that continually wins the public support. For instance, when it comes to demanding tasks that may involve risks, the European – as well as the American – political decision-makers must be able to remain convinced that they are on the driver's seat when they make important decisions. We need solid institutional arrangements to accomplish this.

At the same time, could it be so that the US cooks the meal and the Europeans do the dishes? In other words, should Europeans be content just to pay the bills and clean up various places when the Americans have left?

Obviously not, on the contrary, the emerging reality is that both US and EU will be important global players, they should shoulder the same responsibilities and they should also enjoy a joint leadership position – a kind of co-leadership, if you will.

I have no illusions regarding this transformation. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve a better world-wide balance between the two actors. There is an element of competition. But we do not want to weaken our resolve nor complicate anything. There is no easy way to achieve this but I believe that we have to begin thinking about how to forge this new co-leadership. Everything requires a very long time to mature.

We can already now focus of such areas where Europe and the U.S. can find complementary interests. One such area is Northern Europe, where, for instance, the promotion of Russia's engagement and participation in the normal flow of decision-shaping in the transatlantic cooperative framework is both actors' priority. We can combine our forces and seek synergies if appropriate.

The Northern Dimension of the EU and the Northern European Initiative of the U.S. in fact have many points in common. They are independent processes, but they also share the same philosophical approach.

Now, the receptiveness by Russia regarding such initiatives may be on the increase. We should seize this new opportunity.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In conclusion, I believe that the importance of trans-atlantic relationship in all relevant areas is growing, not diminishing.

Things are not at all in a bad shape. Yet, in a longer run we have to find new ways and means to make this relationship work also in the future. It will be increasingly complicated. Unilateral responses are not the answer: what is needed is a continued co-leadership with genuine ownership by both Europe and the U.S. In view of the future challenges, we need strength and determination as well as coherence of our actions in order to be able to build a world of secure, open and increasingly prosperous and democratic societies.

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT: THE NEXT TWENTY-YEAR CRISIS?

Alan Lee Williams

The strategic environment remains the most crucial and salient factor affecting the decision to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by nation-states living in a state of nature despite the hopeful atmosphere generated by the end of the cold war. The strategic environment is difficult to predict but it appears to be becoming more volatile.

We can expect the next decade or so to be chaotic and turbulent in which the strategic American power will remain dominant but also diminished by neo-isolationism while Europe is assailed by nationalism along its rimlands and the spectre of mass migrations. The process of European integration will slow down in the short-term in the face of intractable problems associated with the merger of governmental systems, the merger of political systems, the merger of economic systems, the merger of peoples and societies and removal of state boundaries.

The increase in the size of the European Union from 15 to 20+ nations by the year 2020 or beyond will mark the emergence of a wider and essentially non-federal Europe with an inner core of 'federated' states with a single currency and a common macro-economic policy. "... The enlargement of NATO will complement the enlargement of the EU, a parallel process which also for its part contributes significantly to extending security to the new democracies in the East."¹

The Alliance took a momentous step towards building an undivided Europe when Foreign Ministers signed documents in December 1997 paving the way for NATO's opening to three new members. However, NATO's future relevance depends on it seriously going "out of area" if it wants to avoid going into irreversible decline. NATO is adept at flexibility and could transform itself into an "agent of change" that could effectively address contemporary security issues in their broader definition. The enlargement of NATO by only three or four countries carries the risk of creating a new dividing line in Europe, with NATO members on one hand and non-members on the other. In Europe there is a real danger of fragmentation in both NATO and the EU unless and until the issue of 'widening' and 'deepening' is resolved through sweeping institutional change and redefinition of purpose.

It is likely that Japan and China will emerge over the next 10 to 15 years as military hegemon(s) to match their economic dominance of Asia while the population explosion in Africa and Asia will precipitate new global dangers. Both Europe and America will face a multiplicity of missile threats of differing ranges and warheads over the two decades. These missile systems will be in

¹ North Atlantic Council, Ministers Meeting December 1994.

the hands of developing countries reflecting the new axis of global conflict, the North-South conflict thus replacing the past East-West divide. The manifest dangers arising from radical nationalism, ethnic strife and religious fundamentalism will affect Europe as well as other parts of the globe.

A possible way to avoid a crisis in the region is through Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Contact Groups. The PfP countries very much want to join NATO, but will not be invited in the near future for one reason or another. In the last few years, however, NATO has established close working relations of cooperation and partnership with nearly every country in the Euro-Atlantic region. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) builds on the successful experience with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and PfP. It provides a forum to oversee and develop all NATO activities with partner countries, including an enhanced PfP, and is designed as a framework to strengthen relations of all Partners not only with NATO but also among themselves. In EAPC, Allies and Partners are exploring possibilities for regional security cooperation. By the enhancement, PfP will be even better capable of creating a pattern of interaction, cooperation and joint activities among the military and defence structures of the Allies and 27 Partner countries and contribute in a very practical way to NATO's goal of building cooperative security in Europe.

NATO's initiative to introduce a special security forum to reassure Russia about enlargement was announced in February 1997. This is the creation of a NATO-Russian Council. It is important for security and stability in the whole of Europe that USA and Western Europe remain on good terms with Russian Federations. NATO stood just as firmly by its conviction that Russia could become a valuable strategic partner in helping to build a stable Europe. The result was the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and Russia signed in Paris in May 1997. Through the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council (PJC) it gives Russia a voice not a veto on Alliance activities. NATO has made a bold step in bringing Russia closer to the Euro-Atlantic structures.

The European Union (EU) will be moving towards a heightened defence identity but with the conduct of security policies still firmly in the hands of national governments acting through a Europeanised NATO.

Europe's chief weakness will be its ongoing failure to invest enough in command, control and intelligence facilities (C3i), as well as its collective failure to increase expenditure on research and development (R & D).

Difficulties might arise within the EU over the establishment of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) as peacekeeping and possible peace-enforcement policies are exacerbated by national differences. Germany might experience the most difficulty in adjusting to its new-found peacekeeping responsibilities in which both Britain and France are conditionally committed.

NATO could still split over the issue of power projection and the question of global reach. The next decade will see most probably heightened conflict in the southern hemisphere leading to attempted mass migration to the north which will be strongly resisted by the European Union, still coping with indigenous racism in France, Germany and Britain. The consequent drift of refugees, possibly as many as thirty million, is likely therefore to exacerbate national and ethnic conflicts within Europe and along its rimlands. National and (inner city) could lead into violence, thus international terrorism as we have seen will increase against the developed world. The most likely insurgent groups are those driven by Islamic fundamentalists or religious radicals opposed to Western post-modern secular society. The dangers involved in the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) must therefore be seen against the backdrop of this strategic environment.

The growing tendency to acquire WMD and ballistic missiles appears to reflect a number of complex and contradictory motivations which nation states confront when deciding to promote their national interests. Two well-established motivations appear to predominate: military or strategic ambitions and meta-strategic power-play. The former depends upon perceived threats to specific national interests or goals and the latter is derived in part from the prestige which nuclear weapons in particular have historically bestowed upon their possessors

Between 1941 and 1990 an analysis of seven nuclear nations which included the United States, USSR, Britain, France, China, India and Israel identified some of the considerations that led to their decisions to go nuclear. These included world power status, national security, ideological and local area leadership and Alliance obligations.

Similar, if not identical, postures are likely to be adopted by new nuclear powers, although there could be less reassuring crazy nuclear actors as well. Historically, the nuclear postures ranged widely from deterrence by matching an adversary's arsenal, or deterrence by denial of victory (the superpowers), deterrence based on second centre and insurance policy (the UK), proportional deterrence and insurance policy (France), people's war with minimum deterrent (China), insurance against future need (India and Pakistan) and deterrence by denial of victory (Israel). Is it to be expected that future nuclear weapons states will replicate similar postures?

Given the assumption nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction will spread to further nations over the next 20 years or so, what risks are likely to arise with respect to NATO-Europe and its closest allies? Put simply: the risk of nuclear blackmail by a Third World nuclear power; also the risks to NATO and its associated Partnership for Peace/Combined Joint Task Force states arising from nuclear fallout in the event of a nuclear exchange between powers similarly armed, or from a one-sided nuclear use between a nuclear and a non-nuclear power (Japan in 1945 for example).

More crucially perhaps, there is the risk of weapons-grade material falling into the hands of non-state actors which cannot be entirely ruled out and as a result of which terrorist-type demands could be made against legitimate political entities. This could threaten lives and property on an unacceptable scale. Thus NATO is right to regard the pursuit of a non-proliferation policy as a top Alliance priority through participation in or support for arms control arrangements (NPT, CTBT, ABM treaties etc). Yet Alliance support for arms control must not obscure its limitations whether it is pursued bilaterally, multilaterally or indeed unilaterally within a formal or informal framework.

The traditional objectives of arms control, and the new counter terrorist strategy have to enhance global and regional stability to reduce the likelihood of war and to reduce the consequences of war if it occurs. These objectives must continue to be pursued.

By 2020 the international system will have changed considerably but **not** beyond recognition. We will still live in a world of nation-states in which any increase in one state's power, no matter how well-motivated, threatens the interests of other states if the norms and values of democratic states are weakened or repudiated. The fundamental nature of international relations has not changed over the millennia. Clearly, international relations continue to be a recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent states living in a near-state of nature. We must therefore expect conflict as the number of nation-states multiply and the exponential increase in non-state actors produces conflictual interests.

If the developed world's values are to endure, in the face of the new challenges arising from powerful self-seeking states and messianic groups seeking hegemony, then the West-NATO, the European Union and Russia, Japan and a future democratic China, must hang together or hang separately.

For the next 20 years Europe must expect America to lead a more *equal* transatlantic alliance, with due regard to Europe's interests as well as seeking the fulfilment of its own superpower interests. Let us start to prepare for the convergence – economic, political, scientific and technological – of democratic states into a genuine global community capable of defending and sustaining the values of our open, pluralistic societies, the true inheritors of the 21st Century.

SECURITY, INTEGRATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION

Vesa Vainio

Let me begin by expressing our pleasure at being given the opportunity to co-host his seminar. As a company that is active throughout the region, we are delighted to sponsor dialogue aimed at increasing understanding between the peoples of the region.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, we were one of the first western companies to begin business operations in the Baltic countries. As the first foreign bank we opened an office in Tallinn, Estonia in 1993. Since then we have expanded our operations to cover Latvia, Lithuania and Poland as well.

We consider the Baltic countries and Poland as our emerging home market, a natural extension of our present core market which comprises four Nordic countries, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway. As a result of a series of mergers and acquisitions since 1997, we now hold a strong position in each of these countries.

Germany and Russia reach beyond our home territory, but we have a presence in both. They are obviously important markets for us and will also play an important role in shaping the future of the Baltic Sea region.

All political and economic developments in the region will, for better or worse, affect the preconditions for our business activities. Naturally, we would like to see development towards increasing security and integration. In many ways these are inter-related. Together they form the foundation for economic growth.

Lately, discussion regarding the region's security has been centred on the NATO membership of the Baltic countries. Now that this is widely expected and may even be tacitly accepted by all interested parties, I would like to see the focus being moved somewhat further on.

Today, no country in the region is likely to pose an imminent threat to another in the region. I can think of no security arrangements that would need to be directed against another country in the region. It is, however, understandable that the Baltic countries would like to have a solid guarantee against history ever repeating itself.

It is likewise easy to understand why the Baltic countries have prioritised NATO membership above EU membership. The scope of the former is significantly narrower, which makes the joining process shorter and simpler in purely practical terms.

The process should not, however, stop once insurance against history has

been achieved. Hopefully, it will be possible to move from reliance on passive, treaty-based security to the promotion of active security in the form of increased inter-communication, trade and commerce in the region and between all countries of the region.

Recent world developments are widely believed to have opened a window that could be utilised globally to build up trust between former adversaries. It is not inconceivable that the changing political geography will also change the nature of NATO as an organisation. As a clear sign of the changing climate, it is now possible to express thoughts of Russian NATO membership without raising too many eyebrows.

Increased trust between world powers would also help turn a new page in the development of the Baltic Sea region, making the initial reasons for NATO membership obsolete and redundant

Increasing inter-communication, trade and commerce would improve the region's security and stability, but would also contribute to economic growth in the region, thus increasing the welfare of its people in more ways than one.

Even the NATO membership is likely to have some economic consequences for the Baltic countries. Many western investors may perceive eventual membership as a factor securing and stabilising the countries' international position. It is, therefore, possible – even probable – that membership would result in an increasing net inflow of foreign capital into the new member countries, thereby giving a boost to economic growth. But to my mind the real boost to growth will come from increased integration.

To maintain momentum in the enlargement of the EU, it is important to try and influence decision-makers and public opinion in member countries as well as in candidate countries. Within the EU, we need to push forward the changes that will facilitate decision-making in a larger Union.

Likewise, we need to continue discussion within the old member countries of the possible consequences of enlargement. I feel, for instance, that there is a tendency to over-emphasise the risk of mass migration from the potential new member countries to the old. In my experience mass migration usually results from too little integration rather than from too much.

By nature, capital is immensely more mobile than labour. If capital is allowed to move freely there is unlikely to be much need to restrict the mobility of people. Investment flows will help create new jobs and, over time, even out differences in living standards between countries.

I am aware that popular opinion in the Baltic countries is rather favourable towards NATO membership, but somewhat reserved as regards membership of the European Union. We Finns have experience only of the latter, but on balance, this experience has been overwhelmingly positive.

The years of Finland's EU membership have coincided with the longest continuous phase of rapid economic growth in the country's history. The stability that membership has brought has created good preconditions for growth.

This year we have learned that membership cannot isolate us from a worldwide slowdown, but I feel sure that its positive stabilising impact will be felt even now that years have become a bit leaner.

In similar fashion I believe that for the Baltic countries and Poland EU membership would benefit not just the countries themselves, but also the region as a whole. Not only would a larger unified market around the Baltic Sea facilitate growth, it would also create a solid foundation for lasting security as well as increase the region's overall importance in a European context.

NATO – DEFENCE ALLIANCE, TRANSATLANTIC LINK AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION

SPEAKING NOTES

Michael Durkee

NATO as Defense Alliance

-- Article 5 of Washington Treaty – attack on one shall be regarded as attack on all, individual and collective responses as each deems necessary, to restore the security of the North Atlantic area.

-- Originally conceived as North American commitment to join in defense of European allies, demonstrated by common defense doctrine, integrated command structures and deployed US and Canadian forces.

-- Initial signatories joined by Greece and Turkey in 1952 FRG in 1952, Spain in 1982, and Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic in 1999.

-- First 40 years involved large, forward-deployed high-readiness forces to defend NATO territory against conventional attack, supplemented by nuclear deterrence forces.

-- Last 10 years have seen major force cuts, reductions in readiness status, and reorganization into flexible, mobile and deployable forces able to respond to wide range of security risks and new tasks.

-- First invocation of Article 5 on 12 September 2001, responding to attacks in New York and Washington, with NATO sending AWACs to US and naval forces to Eastern Mediterranean.

-- NATO reserves the right and has the capability to respond to terrorist actions or threats at time and place NAC may decide.

NATO as Trans Atlantic Link

-- Reflects history of first half of 20th century, when US and Canada sent forces to Europe to defeat aggression and restore peace.

-- Political and military structures of NATO designed to ensure shared responsibility and decision-making: US senior military commanders at ACE and ACLANT, European Secretary General and Chairman, Military Committee, multi-national staffs at all levels.

-- Deployed US and Canadian forces to Europe, US commitment of nuclear forces, acceptance of Host Nation Support responsibilities by most European nations, permanent consultations and consensus-building on security issues and collective responses.

-- Structure and process of defense planning creates transparency and mutual confidence among allies: multi-national review of individual plans and commitments to meet commonly-defined requirements.

-- Strong transatlantic bonds founded on shared risks, shared responsibilities, shared benefits: NATO profile and relevance reinforced in US today.

NATO as Crisis Management Instrument

-- First post-Cold War revision of Strategic Concept in 1991 emphasizing cooperation with former adversaries and expanded security for Europe as a whole.

-- In 1992, as Balkan situation worsened, NATO agreed to support, on case-by-case basis, peace-keeping operations in cooperation with UN or CSCE (later OSCE), including commitment of Alliance resources and forces for enforcement of UNSC resolutions.

-- Painful experience with UN operations in Balkans led to NAC decisions in 1995 to use military force to end Serb siege of Sarajevo, to enforce the UN-directed cease-fire, and to accept the leading role in implementation of the military and security aspects of the Dayton peace accords, first IFOR, now SFOR.

-- In response to Belgrade-inspired violence in Kosovo in 1998, NAC authorized preparations for military force, but then agreed to support OSCE efforts to end the violence. Political efforts, led by the Contact Group, to resolve the underlying disputes at the Rambouillet Conference were blocked by Milosevic's refusal to agree to an overall settlement, and Serb forces resumed their repression of the Kosovar civilian population.

-- When efforts to achieve action by the UN Security Council failed, NAC authorized military force to stop the Serbs and to prevent a humanitarian disaster. The NATO campaign Allied Force eventually forced Serb withdrawal from Kosovo, the passage of UNSCR 1244, and the deployment of KFOR and UNMIK to take charge of the territory until its final status is resolved. We owe much to the skills and dedication of former President Ahtisaari and former Premier Chernomyrdin to end this sad and unnecessary conflict.

-- In addition to ALLIED FORCE and KFOR, NATO also conducted operations in Albania and FYROM to support humanitarian relief activities for the nearly one million refugees expelled from Kosovo by the Serbs. More recently, at the request of FYROM leaders, NATO has been conducting other operations to help stabilize that country.

-- With the exception of ALLIED FORCE and ESSENTIAL HARVEST, all these Balkan operations have been conducted on a NATO-plus basis, with contributions and active participation by Partners and other nations, including Muslim countries (Morocco, Jordan, UAE, Malaysia, Egypt).

-- NATO does not seek to be world policeman nor to usurp roles of UN or OSCE. But when faced with threats to security in Euro-Atlantic area, NATO is prepared to act if other means are not successful. Please consider what might have been the consequences if NATO had refused to act.

-- NATO-led PKO have also been valuable opportunity to build confidence and interoperability with non-NATO nations; thousands of troops and officers have now worked side-by-side to help provide security in the Balkans. Recognize this situation has not been easy for Russia, but applaud the professionalism and cooperation of the Russian military in working with the NATO staffs and other contributors.

NATO as Catalyst for Wider Security Cooperation

-- Through PfP, EAPC, Mediterranean Dialogue, NATO-Russia PJC, NATO-Ukraine NUC, SEEI and other mechanisms, NATO has contributed to a wider process of consultations and cooperation to promote security.

-- While PfP is a 19+1 relationship, Partners have been encouraged to undertake political and military reforms which improve transparency and confidence among their neighbors - civilian control of the military normally leads to more open public debate about defense budgets, force levels, equipment purchases and other matters which were often treated as state secrets in the past.

-- Moreover, these same processes, like the SEEI, are open to participation by non-NATO countries, who can then help contribute to regional security, as Slovenia has done with its International Trust Fund for Demining, Romania by hosting the Center for Cross-Border Crime, and Bulgaria by assisting FYROM with border security measures.

-- In this context, NATO enlargement is both a historical reality and a constructive element in the broader process of European integration. This does not mean that NATO is the best or only answer to the security needs of all European nations, or that NATO enlargement is an end in itself. But NATO has been and will remain an important actor in the longterm, complex, occasionally difficult, but generally positive evolution toward a Europe which is truly whole, free and at peace.

NATO ENLARGEMENT AND PUBLIC SUPPORT

Jamie Shea

Presenting NATO to public opinion used to be a relatively straightforward affair. When I first joined NATO in 1980, the then Secretary General, Joseph Luns, asked me to write a speech for him. I looked at a blank sheet of paper for most of the night and then suddenly found inspiration in a new Pentagon glossy brochure, entitled Soviet Military Power. This publication listed all of the latest Soviet weapons systems with accompanying photographs. I simply reproduced the entire list from Kirov class cruisers to SS20 missiles and gave this to Luns as his speech. He afterwards told me that it was one of the best speeches he ever delivered. It hardly mentioned the word NATO, and didn't talk about what we were doing, but only about what our adversary was doing.

In other words it made the public case for NATO not by talking about what NATO was, but what it was not. At that time the justification for the Alliance was simply to be there, rather like the statue of the Commander in Don Giovanni. Security was about providing a counter-weight to the Soviet Union in order to maintain the status quo in Europe. As long as NATO was able to sustain adequate force levels to ensure deterrence and a minimal level of communication with its eastern adversary, not much more was required. NATO was hardly talked about in newspapers except during infrequent ministerial meetings. There were occasional controversies which mobilised people on the streets, such as when NATO decided to modernise its land-based theatre nuclear weapons, with Cruise and Pershing in the early 1980s, but once confronted with the status quo of actual deployment, public opinion appeared to acquiesce, and the demonstrations subsided.

The end of the Cold War has obviously changed all of this. In the first place, absent the traditional threat which gave it its *raison d'être*, the Alliance has had to explain why it should still exist – if it is not because it believes that the traditional threat is secretly still there and may one day return. This is a point which constantly comes up with Russian audiences.

But more importantly the new security environment in Europe means that organisations such as NATO have had to move from being to doing. The test today is not to provide a counterweight to an ideologically competing system but to actively shape the security environment as far to the east as possible so that new threats are contained early or prevented from arising in the first place. Doing, however, is much harder than being. It involves making difficult judgement calls, balancing the risks of action against the risks of inaction, and weighing the relevant probabilities of different scenarios. As a result, and somewhat paradoxically, most of NATO's recent decisions, which NATO insiders have found necessary to keep the Alliance in business as a viable security organisation, have proved enormously controversial with our public

opinion. Moreover, in many cases NATO traditionalists have been more disturbed by these new directions than NATO's old opponents who, thinking that the new Alliance will be more political and less military, have turned into unexpected supporters.

Take for instance, NATO enlargement. In the late 1990s, NATO supporters were worried that this would over-extend the Alliance's capabilities, rather like Delilah taking away Samson's powers. They worried that extending NATO security guarantees to new members in the east would be at the expense of their own defences or would make it impossible for the Allies to take decisions. Opponents on the other hand worried about the economic consequences of the new democracies of central and eastern Europe having to massively increase defence budgets, purchase western aircraft and sacrifice their sovereignty. The Russian campaign against the first round of NATO enlargement further fuelled these anxieties in both camps and was certainly encouraged by the many indications that western elites also had their doubts about NATO enlargement. Indeed the western concerns played on the Russian concerns and vice-versa.

In other words NATO enlargement was the first sign that in the new security environment in Europe, every time NATO wanted to do something new it would have to convince its supporters as well as its opponents simultaneously. Instead of having automatic supporters or automatic opponents, NATO would find that there would be shifting coalitions of supporters on each particular issue. For instance many opponents of NATO's enlargement on Europe's political left later became fervent supporters of the Alliance's humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. Henry Kissinger was in favour of NATO enlargement, but vigorously opposed to the Founding Act between the Alliance and Russia which he memorably described as "allowing the camel's nose under the tent". The debate is no longer between supporters and opponents. It is between modernisers and traditionalists.

Another feature of the new proactive approach to security is that it is sometimes difficult to win the intellectual debate in advance of the actual thing happening. What has finally silenced the opponents of NATO enlargement is the actual reality of enlargement itself which has demonstrated that their worst fears – about creating new divisions in Europe, alienating Russia or militarising central and eastern Europe – were unfounded.

Another example of these difficulties is Kosovo. There is normally no problem with public opinion when Alliance territory is directly threatened or even attacked. We have recently seen this in the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States. It may seem strange that self-defence means bombing terrorist training camps as far away as Afghanistan, but this is supported by massive 70%-90% majorities of public opinion, not just in the United States, but in most European allied countries as well.

The situation was far more difficult in 1999 when NATO had to make the case for intervention in Kosovo. Many wondered why allied countries should risk the lives of their pilots and soldiers in far away places (even though Kosovo is only

one hour's flight-time from Frankfurt.) Others wondered why the whole issue could not be solved by diplomacy alone. It was difficult to make the case for the use of force on a very major scale where Alliance security was not immediately threatened and where the loss of life, although significant, had not yet reached genocidal proportions.

Moreover, while many supported the use of force in principle to relieve the plight of the Kosovo Albanians, they soon recoiled at its direct consequences. Public support in Germany for Operation Allied Force fell by 20% on average every time television showed NATO's "collateral damage". Very firm political leadership was required to keep public opinion behind the air campaign, particularly as many lost patience when success was not achieved after 48 hours. One very senior military commander later complained to me that this was the first conflict in which he had spent three times longer in TV studios than in his military command centre.

The problem with humanitarian operations is also that credibility gained in one operation can easily and quickly be lost in the next operation. This time last year we were worried about Montenegro. What would happen if Milosovic would send in his armed forces to prevent Montenegrin independence? The situation was not the same as in Kosovo the year before and we had few good options either political or military. The worry was that all of the credibility that we struggled so hard to regain in Kosovo after the hesitations in Bosnia in the early 1990s would be forfeited.

In the age of doing rather than being, security organisations like NATO are judged not by their past glories but by their ability to handle the current crisis. It is rather like the manager of a modern-day football team. He may have won the league title or the Football Association Cup two years before, but lose six games in a row this season and he is out of business.

A third example is the European security and defence policy. For NATO insiders this is seen as a good way of getting the Europeans to do more for their defence and achieve a more equitable transatlantic burden-sharing. But many on the political right, particularly in the UK, worry that the creation of a "Euro-army" will be at the expense of NATO and transatlantic solidarity. Others on the left, and this has been the case with the Green Party in the Netherlands recently, suddenly decide that they like NATO's defence structures more than those of the European Union because the looser inter-governmental NATO framework gives them more sovereignty and opt-out possibilities than the more integrated, binding and supranational EU (at least as far as non-Article 5 operations are concerned).

In the current environment, NATO no longer has the monopoly of security policy that it enjoyed during the Cold War. There are two reasons for this. One is that security policy has been redefined to cover virtually every aspect of government. We see this most clearly in the current campaign against terrorism where intelligence-sharing, police cooperation, combating money-laundering, international tribunals and enhancing airport security are seen as equally

important, indeed many would argue in the long run more important, than air strikes and special forces operations. In this new, more all-embracing concept of security, virtually every international organisation, be it the EU, the International Monetary Fund, the UN or Europol can claim to be a security organisation. Indeed the success of one depends upon its ability to cooperate with all the others in a rational division of labour and to define a system of comparative advantage.

In such an environment where we talk of "interlocking institutions", the specific role of NATO is fuzzier than it was during the Cold War. On the other hand, police work behind the scenes, intelligence sharing and freezing terrorists bank accounts are not the sort of things that appear easily on TV. Military operations, as NATO discovered during the Kosovo air campaign, are what really excite journalists and generate all the publicity. Thus NATO with its military hardware, compared to the other institutions, continues to enjoy a certain media advantage.

The second reason why NATO's image is somewhat less defined in the new environment is because security challenges have also become more diffuse. Some are latent, such as weapons of mass destruction. The public realises that the threat exists out there but doesn't know how seriously to take it. Anthrax in the hands of terrorists cannot be conveniently quantified and easily defined like Soviet armour pointing at the Fulda Gap during the Cold War. The threat of weapons of mass destruction may go up or may suddenly go down, particularly if democratic change occurs in countries like Iran, North Korea, Iraq, Libya or Syria. If governments talk too much about weapons of mass destruction they may panic civilian populations or induce a sense of fatalism. On the other hand because these threats are latent doesn't mean that they mustn't be discussed or taken seriously. Indeed the current Anthrax incidents in the United States show how suddenly these threats can change from abstract to real, and in ways well nigh impossible to anticipate.

Terrorism is a similar problem. We know that it exists and the World Trade Centre shows its awesome destructiveness not only in physical terms, but in accelerating an economic downturn. But who is behind it, with what objectives and where is the next attack going to come from? When can we safely say that the war against terrorism has been won and we can all feel safe again? Nobody knows. This is a conflict in which it is going to be difficult to measure our progress, let alone decide when the coast is clear enough to declare victory and relax our efforts.

Equally in the new security environment each ally has a different set of security concerns unlike the Soviet Union which was universally perceived as everyone's number one security problem. Refugees from the Balkans are clearly a worry for Germany or Italy whereas Spain is more concerned with refugees from Morocco and Norway is more concerned about decommissioned Russian nuclear submarines near the Kola peninsula. A key challenge for NATO's information efforts these days is to convince national public opinions

that their individual set of national priorities is being taken as seriously by NATO HQ as those of all the others.

It also needs explaining that these new problems are all trans-national and that borders are even less successful at stopping drugs or dirty money flows or organised crime than they were at stopping Soviet tanks. Therefore they can only be dealt with through international organisations and multilateral structures. As a result, in this new environment, NATO, as a prime mover of international action to address the new security challenges, becomes even more important despite the end of the Cold War.

How does the new security environment affect public perceptions of NATO? In the first place security issues are still a matter for elites rather than masses. As NATO countries move to professional armies and abolish conscription, a smaller percentage of the population has any experience of defence and military matters. The public looks to its elites for guidance on how to judge security questions. Where elites, having formed a political consensus among the major political parties in government and opposition, are basically conveying the same orientations, publics are normally content to follow. On the other hand, when the major political parties disagree on basic orientations, which happened when the European left radicalised on the question of nuclear deterrence in the early 1980s, street protests against NATO's plans to deploy Cruise and Pershing missiles soon followed. As a result it is more important to have political consensus on security issues than to have high percentage poll figures of public support.

In second place, the public want the end but not the means. They want to have total security but for the cheapest price. They do not make the case between adequate levels of defence spending and adequate security particularly at a time when they do not perceive any direct threat to their territories. They do not link their individual security and well-being to national security. The public prefers tangible benefits such as schools, roads and hospitals which provide instant gratification and which it can see and even physically touch rather than national security which is an intangible value. Indeed during prolonged periods of general peace, such as the one that Europe has experienced since 1945, peace is viewed as a systemic or even natural product rather like oxygen or sunshine. It becomes disconnected from specific political choices or budgetary levels. It often takes a total shock to re-establish this connection as happened with the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914 or the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, a time at which the United States had an army of only 150,000 soldiers. Terrorism may today constitute such a total shock which will re-establish this connection between the enjoyment of security and national effort or even sacrifice.

In the third place the public likes the status quo. Countries that are neutral want to remain neutral, even if neutrality does not have the same significance as it once did; and countries which are in NATO want to stay in NATO even if the justifying threat of the Soviet Union has disappeared. For any political leader the most difficult challenge is convincing people why things have to change

given the public's proclivity to adjust to the status quo. Decisions to provoke big changes are usually based on forward-looking projections of what will happen if change doesn't take place or is postponed, such as in business restructuring. But the public is only alert to the current situation. If that seems normal enough, why change? On the other hand, once the new reality has been created, it becomes the new status quo and the public adapts to it as if it has always been there. This was the case in the 1960s when France changed from the old Franc to the new Franc and will no doubt be the same when the United Kingdom eventually adopts the Euro. The task of political leadership is to win sufficient public support to make the transition to the new reality at least feasible. On most of the big complex questions of the modern world there is usually at least 25% of "don't knows" who will be swayed by a decisive political campaign.

Finally, the public distinguishes between liking something, or feeling enthusiastic about it, and feeling that it is inevitable. For instance a recent opinion poll in Finland on NATO membership revealed that less than 35% of Finns wanted to join NATO but 80% believed that Finland would one day nonetheless be in the Alliance. There are similar poll results in the UK on the Euro. International organisations, such as NATO, the EU or the UN, don't expect to be loved but for the public to at least see them as necessary and useful. The task of political leaders who want to lead from the front on a major foreign policy choice is to create the impression of inevitability (i.e. we will be members or it is in our national interest to be members) so that public opinion is prepared to accept the ultimate result, even if not always with overwhelming enthusiasm. After all, we don't like going to the dentist or paying our taxes, but we do it. On the other hand, the historical evidence is that public support for NATO only increases significantly once a country has actually joined. This has been the case in Spain which held a referendum on NATO not before but after joining the Alliance in 1982 and in eastern Germany after German unification and NATO membership in 1990. This of course is the result of the new status quo factor which I just referred to but also to the fact that the public sees that initial fears over loss of sovereignty or domination by the United States are groundless.

Let me turn, in conclusion, to NATO enlargement and to those things that NATO's current 9 candidate countries can do to explain security policy to their public opinion. I want to stress in this connection that I am not talking about Finland which is not a candidate for NATO membership and is therefore beyond the scope of this analysis.

The first thing a NATO candidate must not do is to accept "opinion poll fatalism". The results of polls clearly depend on the questions that people are asked. Questions often are designed to solicit certain answers. Because people give answers doesn't necessarily mean that they hold strong views. They sometimes answer to pretend that they have a view and therefore avoid a confession of ignorance vis-à-vis the pollster. A decisive political campaign which explains the choices and the issues clearly can often turn round opinion polls very rapidly. With a couple of well-timed press conferences and TV

appearances, President Mitterand was able to increase French support for the Gulf War in 1991 from less than 50% to nearly 70%.

Next, these governments have to explain that standing aside from common, institutionalised security arrangements does not provide the security that it once did. Countries cannot opt out of the new security challenges in the way that they could declare themselves neutral in the confrontation between the West and the Soviet Union. Organised crime networks, weapons smugglers, terrorists and drugs syndicates don't respect either neutrality or borders in deciding where to establish their networks. Refugees fleeing ethnic conflicts do not politely bypass neutral states in looking for shelter. Weapons of mass destruction do not conveniently restrict their devastating effects to the territorial limits of NATO countries. Those seeking to protect themselves from these modern scourges can do so only by being part of international organisations and international coalitions. To be "out" rather than "in" does not mean that international cooperation is impossible, as NATO's Partnership for Peace and the EAPC have demonstrated. Indeed Finland, as a non-aligned country, has not only benefited from the cooperation that PfP and EAPC bring but has also used these mechanisms to bring its own experience and perspectives to bear on European security debates. But less than full participation does mean less influence and a smaller voice when policy is determined and decisions are taken. Even if non-NATO countries do not wish to confront this fact in terms of NATO membership they have to face it in the EU which is rapidly developing its own security and defence policy. In the new world security can less than ever before be gained alone.

When security debates begin, it is important that they focus on the real issues and not bogus issues and myths. If political leaders spend all their time trying to counter the arguments of certain minority groups that NATO membership means massive defence spending, loss of sovereignty or nuclear weapons stationed on national territory, they have less time putting over the real arguments. We recently saw in the Irish EU Nice Treaty referendum campaign how easy it is for small unrepresentative but well-organised and vociferous groups to hijack the agenda and make sure that the debate takes place uniquely on their terms. The anti-globalisation demonstrators in Seattle or Genoa attempt no less. Rather than let this happen, political leaders must clearly set out what the real agenda is and keep the debate focused on that real agenda.

Public debates can all too easily focus on the costs of a project rather than the benefits. It is therefore important to constantly stress that NATO membership also has advantages and that the advantages outweigh the inevitable costs – otherwise there will be no point in joining a security organisation such as NATO. The experience of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland which have continued their economic reforms and growth while joining NATO clearly demonstrates that the costs of joining NATO are easily manageable. In any case, neutrality is also not a cost-free option. Neutral countries require military forces, border guards, intelligence services and anti-terror organisations just like NATO countries. These are dictated as much, if not more by threat

perceptions and national security interests than by Alliance obligations. Consequently, such costs are not directly linked to NATO membership, contrary to what public opinion sometimes believes. Indeed the experience of Sweden during the Cold War demonstrated that the price of neutrality was often higher than NATO membership as the country had to try to do everything by itself rather than rely on the support of allies.

A further point to counter in the NATO enlargement debate is the notion that small means insignificant. I frequently hear it said in some of the smaller NATO candidate countries that "we are too small to make a difference or to have much influence on NATO policy making. Also we don't have a great deal to contribute, so why would NATO want us?" These arguments have always struck me as the opposite of the truth. It is precisely the smaller countries of Europe that need international organisations as the force multipliers for their diplomacy and to ensure that their voices are taken into account. Even if it is not always in their long-term interest, super-powers can eschew multilateral arrangements and international organisations as the United States has frequently been accused of doing – although in my view often unjustly – in the past. Indeed participation in international organisations gives small states access to a great deal of information and intelligence that they would otherwise not have and they can shape their contribution to international security operations, such as SFOR in Bosnia or KFOR in Kosovo in ways which make sense in view of their limited military capabilities. Indeed I have known of many occasions in NATO where small allies have been able to play key roles in reconciling differences between major allies. Luxembourg, for instance, was very instrumental in bringing NATO and Russia together on its territory to negotiate the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997 at a time when differences between NATO and Russia over enlargement were at their most virulent.

It is equally important for governments to foster a culture of security debates within their countries. One way to do this is for ministers and senior officials to consult the opposition on security issues in a spirit of bipartisanship and to brief parliamentary foreign affairs and defence committees regularly. Where the information is sensitive, the briefings can be held in camera as happens in the United States Congress. It is also important for ministers to spend the necessary time briefing journalists in depth and cultivating leading journalists on a background or even off-the-record basis so that the latter develop a sophisticated understanding of the issues and the workings of security policy making in a democratic society. Governments can also encourage their military to develop an active public relations policy, particularly in advertising good-news stories such as the participation of armed forces in humanitarian operations or NATO's peacekeeping in the Balkans. Military officers are often best at educating the public into military realities, or what military forces can be expected reasonably to achieve or not achieve. Governments can also support the work of research institutes, think-tanks and Atlantic committees and participate actively in their debates which can sometimes be a useful and necessary "reality check".

Of course, encouraging independent security policy analysis and commentary is not always comfortable for a government because it means that its own decisions will inevitably be subject to independent scrutiny and debate. But in my view no security policy has ever suffered from being publicly debated and it keeps governments on their toes, helping to avoid complacent bad policy. A policy which has also survived rigorous scrutiny and debate is much more likely to be accepted by the public than one which has been imposed from on high in the form of a dictat. An active security community of officials academics and journalists and in which the military are encouraged to play their role is also necessary to educate opposition parties during their years in the political wilderness so that they are more likely to conduct responsible security policies when they finally win back power.

One final reflection concerns the current campaign against terrorism. As we have recently seen in the United States and Germany, finance ministers are now being persuaded to loosen the public purse strings so that more funds can be allocated to national security agencies to combat terrorism. Fearing further terrorist attacks, public opinion is likely to demand that extra funds be spent on homeland defence (such as airport security, more policing of public buildings, tighter immigration controls and bigger intelligence agencies) than on the armed forces. But the ability to project forces in response to terrorist attacks is also fundamental in finally defeating terrorism, in the same way that we once defeated slavery and piracy – at least in the democratic world. Therefore a key task of political leadership will be to convince public opinion that extra spending has to be fairly distributed between homeland defence and forward defence.

The British philosopher, Bertrand Russell once said that in totalitarian societies "100% of the people are condemned to be enthusiastic about 100% of everything for the rest of their lives". Clearly NATO's aim is not to have 100% popular support in either Allied or candidate countries – a dubious figure under any circumstances. It is to ensure that the relevant opinion leaders are sufficiently educated about security issues to shape reasonable decisions and to carry a robust majority – if not totality – of public opinion behind them. There may be a temptation for governments in NATO's candidate countries to conduct a vigorous public opinion campaign in the run-up to next year's Prague summit, be rewarded by an invitation to join NATO and then promptly lapse back into inaction thinking that the job has been done. But public opinion is no more static than the overall security environment which is much more fast-moving and liable to sudden surprise than it ever was during the Cold War. Shocks, such as we saw in the September 11 attacks against the World Trade Centre, are becoming the rule rather than the exception. NATO to remain relevant has to follow that evolution so that major decisions and choices have to be taken much more frequently than was ever the case in the old days of the Soviet Union. Rather like Sisyphus forever rolling his stone up the mountain only to see it roll back down again, governments have to engage public opinion continually. As the Kosovo air campaign in 1999 demonstrated, a single event can wipe out 20-30% of public support overnight which it can then take years to make up again. Small events, which ultimately turn out to be without substance – such as the "depleted uranium crisis" last January – can nevertheless

achieve enormous proportions if they occur during a quiet news cycle and are quickly picked up in the mainstream media from one country to the next. They too can take away hard-earned public support. The British 19th century libertarian, Jeremy Bentham, famously said that "the price of democracy is eternal vigilance". Were he alive today he would no doubt have added "and public support" immediately after the world democracy.

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THE SECURITY IMPACT OF NATO ENLARGEMENT FOR THE BALTIC SEA REGION – A DANISH PERSPECTIVE

Troels Frøling

It is important to examine the visions for the development of the Baltic future security. This is the headline for this seminar organised by the Atlantic Council of Finland. I would like to complement our Finnish host for the setting up of this important event and look forward to a fruitful seminar.

With membership of NATO for the first time the overall security of these countries will be firmly embedded in the voluntary defence & security cooperation which has existed since 1949, but actually has its basis in the Atlantic Charter of 1941, the declaration which led to the establishment of the United Nations in 1945.

European history tells us about alliances who having served their purpose – when the war is won or lost – are abandoned and new times begin. This is not the case with NATO. When the Soviet Union disappeared in 1991 the NATO member countries did not see their interests served by seeing their organisation fade away. They saw the purposes of NATO as much more than that of deterring a real or potential enemy from without keeping the threats away. In the years that have followed we have seen the NATO member countries together with partners working on the opportunity to develop a new Euro Atlantic security system with the European Union and Russia. I need only mention IFOR, SFOR, Kosovo, KFOR, PfP, PfP plus, in the spirit of PfP. Add to this in the Baltic Sea area a lot of other initiatives such as BALTBAT, BALTDEFCOL, BALTNET, BALTRON, a number of bilateral activities and a number of exercises involving countries around the Baltic Sea to illustrate a development being seen in the interest of the countries, members or partners of NATO, taking care of security in the Balkans, preventing major wars in Southern Europe.

In his European speech this summer president Bush in Warsaw gave a very positive assessment of the development of European affairs, including the enlargement of NATO and the cooperation with Russia. The latest US-Russia, NATO-Russia, EU-Russia meetings following 11 September illustrate the development of what hopefully will turn out to be a new US-Russian strategic understanding based on cooperation with Russia in the new Europe as a strong partner for the European countries and USA.

So things do not look that bad for the Baltic Sea area.

11 September – Some More or Less Likely Consequences

A general observation: the world will never be the same after the September 11 terror attacks and the subsequent international reactions. During the last

decade three events – the Gulf War 1990-1991, the NATO-Serbia military action (Kosovo) 1999 and now WTC-Pentagon – all have a common denominator: the New World Order with the international system being dominated by one superpower .

The three events furthermore are similar because they are characterised by so called asymmetric military actions against international lawbreakers who act against agreed norms in the international community – the international community reacting against actions violating state sovereignty (Gulf War), against genocide and atrocities against humanity (Kosovo) and against international terrorism (September 11).

Based upon the resolution by the United Nation's security council of 12 September, we now see the emergence of a coherent global political unit able to act in concordance, namely the international community. This is the new dimension.

In general it is true that what defines the future is the alliances we make, the aid we demand, the promises we will make and the price we have to pay for the things we must have. There is in other words always a price and all sides in the present conflict will have to realise this.

In an overall strategic perspective one of the winners in the war that started 11 September may turn out to become Russia. Reasons: USA will have to fight an extended war in Afghanistan, the geography of which makes Russia indispensable to the United States. USA can get to Afghanistan through Pakistan or through the independent republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Pakistan is unstable and extremely complicated for several reasons.

Going in through the three Central Asian republics means moving into Russia's sphere of influence, even if these three states are independent. The new war against terrorism requires the active support of Russia. Washington will rely heavily on Russia to maintain stability in these three countries, especially in Tajikistan which numbers substantial pro-Taliban and anti-American forces. The net result of this war could therefore be that Russia will try to reassert its sphere of influence with active support from the USA in a region which broke away from the Soviet empire some 10 years ago.

The USA will most probably also meet Russian demands in another field: Chechnya. In return for fighting terrorism in Afghanistan, Russia expects to be permitted to fight terrorism in Chechnya.

A quid pro quo from Moscow? Consequences? Well, if Moscow cannot win in Chechnya unless it dominates the whole of Caucasus, then Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan will have to be included – back in the USSR? Is this a valid perspective for a post 11 September development?

Russia thus seems to be in a demander position vis-a-vis Washington.... Now the return of Russian power to Central Asia seems to be a natural outcome of the ongoing events. Not so with Caucasus, as this is not necessary for the USA in order to achieve its mission. Nevertheless, Washington for the time being may have to accept a greater say of Moscow in the Caucasus ...

This takes me to the point which has a direct bearing on the title of this workshop. What about the area of the Baltic Sea states? Russia does not want any further NATO expansion and certainly not wants to see any part of the former USSR included into NATO. In the present international context this argument does not carry any weight as the Baltic Sea area is not essential to the US mission in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the US dependency on Russia leaves a window of opportunity open which Russia may use to try to redefine its relations with these regions as well as with Ukraine.

The present war has turned the last decade`s wishful thinking upside down. The United States realises that geopolitics, just like economics, leave nations with far fewer choices than their policymakers would like to think they have. Washington will have to fight the war with Russian help. There is a price. Washington cannot win without Moscow`s help. The price will be high... and what happens in the Afghan war will pave the way for the next constellation, or confrontation.

Now to the tactical situation: a few days ago president Putin at the EU said that he might review his views about NATO enlargement if NATO were to move to become a political organisation. EU reaction – to give Russia a seat at its monthly security and foreign policy meetings. Meeting NATO secretary general Lord Robertson Putin asked the kto kogo question – who will benefit from NATO enlargement – with the reaction that NATO will set up a working body to establish closer cooperation with Russia. President Bush`s national security adviser Condoleezza Rice last week stated that USA and Russia “may be on their way to a fundamentally different relationship”. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that the US relations with Russia have experienced “a seismic sea change of historic proportions” in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks and that president Putin`s talks of a possible membership of NATO hopefully also will begin to shape the discussion leading up to the Prague summit “on how one might enlarge NATO and do it in a way that no one will find threatening”...

While Russia seems to have got the tacit understanding of Washington as to Central Asia, in the Baltic situation/context it seems that Moscow is putting pressure on the EU, not least Germany. German voices that the united front against terrorism must not be endangered by an inappropriate NATO enlargement have been heard following Putin`s visit to Berlin and the EU as such.

The best of all worlds will never come true. If Russia however now has chosen civilization and fight against barbarism, if Russia is joining the broad international framework of democratic coalition it could contribute to strengthen

moderate and non-aggressive forces in the Middle East, to isolation of terrorists within regions and states. Such an attitude could lead to a joint US-Russian cooperation programme on the MD development, common understanding on the NATO enlargement etc...

In sum: The September 11 terrorist attacks may change the prospects for NATO enlargement in 2002. There is however little agreement among observers as to whether enlargement will be any more or less likely than before the attacks.

Because of NATO being preoccupied the issue of enlargement might get less priority, depending of course on further events after the first upcoming military reaction from the US. This is the one kind of arguments that will make it less likely that enlargement will proceed with many invitees.

The other kind of arguments go in the opposite direction: Russia could in the war against terrorism find common ground with the USA. The shared threat perception coupled with effective US-Russian cooperation may help enlargement if it establishes a new level of trust between the USA and Russia, thus making NATO enlargement with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania a matter of less concern for Russia. In the aftermath of 11 September we realize that politics make strange bedfellows. This may not be the worst thing to happen.

Conclusion – The Atlantic Necessity

Let me conclude: The strategic situation in the Baltic Sea area is more secure than ever. We have to cooperate to help change the minds of men around the Baltic Sea. Two major steps are necessary as the backbones for all other initiatives: participation in or membership of international organisations as the EU and NATO for those who want to and qualify and further development of the civil society in each of our countries bordering the Baltic Sea.

From a strategic perspective I will conclude by putting things a bit into perspective. The Baltic Sea Area is located in the Northern part of Europe. Whatever will be developed here will be part of a European and Euro-Atlantic process. Historically, during the last fifty years the most important function of the United States has been with the as the balancer from beyond the sea. This is true today, not only in terms of a residual Russian nuclear potential but also in terms of the collective psyche of the European countries. There thus is this maritime dimension in the characteristic of the USA in Europe.

With the USA continuing to be a European power, all imbalances uncertainties and nightmares of Europe are manageable. Without the USA in Europe the ghost from the past would appear, reappear in a rather unpleasant way enhanced by the fact that Germany now is the economic largest player in Europe. So the development of also this part of Europe will be dependent upon the enlightened leadership of the US and the ability to fuse US national interest with the interests of all major and minor partners into a coherent whole. And it is up to the Europeans to widen the strategic horizon in order to make

Washington seriously consider our concerns. The development of the European Security and Defence Policy must take place strictly from within NATO, the Europeans will have to continue to invest in Atlantic security to be a partner. This is happening now with the September 11 call upon article 5 as a direct follow-up. September 11 has changed the cards and the game is on. Geopolitics still matter, the actors are the same, the interests also but there is a change in the international system which gives a chance of seeing mutual interests develop into something of a more lasting character, a stable Russo-Euro-Atlantic relationship.

NATO ENLARGEMENT IN THE BALTIC REGION

Kalev G. Stoicescu

The NATO Summit that took place in Madrid in 1997 erased the Cold War era division line in Europe, the one that took place in Washington, DC, in 1999 specified more clearly the philosophy and likely boundaries of continued enlargement, whereas the NATO Summit due to take place in Prague in 2002 is expected to further enlarge the Alliance up to twenty-six members.

Germany and Denmark have been the first to open a Baltic dimension of NATO. The German unification and the accession of Poland to NATO have significantly extended the presence of the Alliance in our region. The countries in the region that are still outside NATO form now an interesting "trio":

1. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania argue for entry in NATO, whereas they do have a good perspective to enjoy a favourable decision in Prague;
2. Finland and Sweden are practically abandoning their former policy of neutrality/non-alignment but have no (explicit and open) desire to join the Alliance;
3. Russia tries to find new ways of becoming a strategic partner of NATO, meanwhile giving signs of possible change of attitude towards the enlargement issue.

The accession of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to NATO would again change the security environment in the Baltic Sea area. This would exert more political "pressure" on Finland and Sweden to also consider joining the Alliance. This "pressure" would stem from emerging internal debates, rather than from any outside influences.

The Russian rhetoric regarding NATO enlargement in the Baltic region will depend on how the present leadership will be willing and able to "sell" the imminent enlargement to the Russian wider elite and the public. Notwithstanding the fact that the previous Russian leadership (under former president Yeltsin) had pushed itself on this subject "into the corner", the present Russian leaders, who seem to more pragmatic, will likely find a way out (i.e. by highlighting also positive considerations and effects stemming from the enlargement). It would be inappropriate to expect Russian endorsement of the enlargement, whereas a balanced/neutral stance should be regarded as a positive tone.

Baltic-Russian defence related cooperation has been virtually non-existent since 1991 (with the exception of mutual inspections under the OSCE Vienna documents or observation of military exercises that were – however – quite often missed on purpose by the Russian side). The accession of the Baltic

states to NATO would also open the door for increased defense related cooperation under the framework of NATO-Russia agreements. The Russian side will likely be interested in such cooperation, that would also play the role of a major confidence building tool.

The term of collective security, as far as it concerns nations united in the virtue of shared democratic values, has undergone tremendous changes following the tragic and shocking events of September 11. It seems that combating terrorism under its various forms (from suicidal attacks to contaminated letters disseminated throughout the world) is an utmost difficult task. In this situation no nation can consider itself to be out of reach, even if there are no known reasons for being subjected to terror. Therefore, a larger and stronger NATO is not only desirable consideration, but also a real necessity of our time. An increasing number of countries, that include Russia, and why not China and other nations traditionally not supporting NATO, will find it necessary to cooperate with the Alliance in combating terrorism.

Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary have joined a different NATO than the Baltic states and other nations will join in the years to come.

A FINNISH PERSPECTIVE

Pauli Järvenpää

What NATO is and what it is not? It is first and foremost a political organization, but at the same time a political organization with military teeth: it has military staffs, commands, facilities, and earmarked forces. Secondly, it is a forum of consultation and cooperation for the member countries on a wide variety of political, economic, scientific, security and military related areas. What is important to note is that all decisions at NATO are taken by consensus. NATO is an intergovernmental organization in which member countries retain their full sovereignty and independence of action. Thirdly, a major task for NATO has been to prevent the renationalization of defence. To that end, NATO has created integrated multinational military structures with capabilities for collective defence planning and resource allocation for defence purposes. Fourthly, NATO embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is firmly connected to the security of Europe. And finally, through Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty the member countries together are committed to deterring and defending against any threat of aggression against any member state. However, it is instructive to note that it took 50 years for NATO to use weapons in anger, and 52 years to invoke Article 5.

The essence of NATO is, therefore, political. This observation is neither novel nor should it be surprising, since NATO has always, ever since its inception in April 1949, been the twin sister to European economic integration, and these two processes – economic and military integration – are of course profoundly political.

While this observation is not novel, it is however an observation that is important to keep in mind when one approaches the question of enlargement at the Prague Summit. If the main criteria for enlargement were only military, hardly any or the nine aspirant countries (or ten, if one counts Croatia), would get an invitation at Prague. It would be hard to make an argument that any one of these countries alone or in any combination would bring significant added value to the Alliance's military capabilities. There is in fact an interesting paradox: the larger aspirants (Romania, Bulgaria) that could in military terms offer more than the others, are actually worst off in terms of their defence reform (they have hopelessly old military structures and tons of decaying military equipment), while the smaller countries (such as the Baltic states) are furthest into looking like modern military structures (what they in turn still lack is military muscle within that structure). But, as I have emphasized, the next tranche of NATO enlargement is not only about military security; it will be first and foremost about security politics.

Just to make my point even more forcefully, witness the MAP programme with its five issue areas: political and economic; resources; legal; personnel and document security; and defence and military issues. The defence and military

issues are just one area out of the five issue areas. So, at the end it is just as important to have one's national laws in shape to let one's soldiers take part in exercises or operations outside the national borders as it is to have brigades and battalions equipped with shiny military gear. Or in the political sphere, corruption will need to be under control – which, perhaps surprisingly to a Finnish audience, is not at all a foregone conclusion in the nine aspirant countries. Or security arrangements will have to be in place for the country's authorities to be able to properly handle the flow of classified NATO and member country information.

So, since the enlargement process is such a highly political process, I fully expect as many as 7-8 countries to be invited for membership negotiations at the Prague Summit in November 2002. The NATO demonstration of political solidarity in the aftermath of the 9-11 events in the United States has only further strengthened my point. It is the common values and shared interests that are important for the transatlantic community, and that, I believe, will translate into as wide an enlargement as possible.

If this analysis is correct, it has a number of important repercussions in the Baltic Sea area. First, enlargement will be an expansion of the community of like-minded states sharing the same basic values. What it is clearly not, is building a military bulwark against Russia. Second, any military arrangements in the Baltic countries will probably be "NATO Lite", with various demonstrations of self-restraint (for example, no permanent allied troop presence, no allied bases, and of course, no nuclear weapons in the Baltic states). Third, major themes of cooperation, derived from the fundamental tasks of the NATO Strategic Concept of 1999, will be such issues as campaign against international terrorism, WMD, TMD/BMD, and non-proliferation. In sum, it will be first and foremost the political NATO that will expand to the borders of Russia and only secondarily the military alliance. This, I think, will be crucial from the Russian point of view. President Putin is a strategic thinker, and he has already understood this.

This all has fundamental repercussions also for such countries as Finland and Sweden. The question is no longer whether these two countries would want to join an alliance against something; rather it is whether they would want to join an alliance for something. So, instead of analyzing our security environment in military terms, we will have to learn to frame our analysis in such terms as participation, core values, and decision-making. For example, do we want to fully participate in making decisions that will in any case affect us; do we want to share the costs of defence with other like-minded nations; and do we want to bear the burden of defending the common values and mutually shared interests? These questions are profoundly political, only secondarily military. This debate is slowly starting now in Finland, and it is about time.

THE LATVIAN NATO MEMBERSHIP – A GOAL WITHOUT ALTERNATIVES

Artis Pabriks

Like most of us, I as a person represent multiple identities. I am associate professor in Vidzeme University College. As well as I am NATO Board member and political analyst in the Latvian Centre for Human Rights and Ethnic Studies. I believe that this is an identity combination usual to most of the people who live in the global, multiethnic world. In the same way, I believe that simultaneous Latvian membership in the various international organizations, including NATO is a normal condition for the vital and modern state. Moreover, I believe there are no feasible alternative to this membership.

I believe, that NATO membership:

- Provides Latvia with stable international and regional security prospects;
- Increases domestic Latvian political stability and thus supports sustainable development;
- The Latvian membership in NATO is beneficial for whole North European region;
- Bolsters the EU enlargement;
- It is good for the Latvian-Russian and Western-Russian relations.

In my further presentation I will shortly comment on the above mentioned positive aspects of the NATO enlargement in the Baltics. As far as the Latvian national perspective is considered, the country as well as the whole Baltic region during its history has never experienced surplus of security. In fact, for the small nation state there are only two ways how to feel relatively secure and have a relatively stable development. In the distant past it was guaranteed by the belonging to or being under the dominance of the larger Empires. Today, the stability, security and prosperity is granted by the participation in the international organizations and alliances.

Of course, there exists also a third possibility, namely the prospects of neutrality. Historical argument against neutral Baltic states would be the attitude of the Baltic neighbours to this principle. I would like to argue, that in its long history, the Baltic region was never considered as politically neutral. Namely, the larger powers bordering Latvia has frequently used the idea of neutrality simply to gain their dominance over this region. Thus, Latvia's declaration of neutrality in 1938 did not increase country's prospects of security at all. Vice versa, it was followed by the Soviet ultimatum and occupation. I am not here to argue about positive or negative aspects of neutrality for Sweden or Finland. But it seems to me that while being officially neutral both countries, at different occasions were not neutral in practice. Moreover, also their national policies were frequently dominated by outside pressures, be it USSR, US or Nazi Germany.

While flying to this conference, I had a pleasure to be engaged in a small talk with an elderly Finnish businessman who boarded the same plane as me.

When asked about his preferences concerning the Finnish NATO membership, he answered to me that he is against Finland becoming a NATO member country because he wants the things remain how they are. To this my answer was, that sometimes, if we want things remain how they are, we have to change ourselves. Namely, I do not believe in the neutrality concept in the global world. Especially, in the world of post September 11, 2001.

Consequences of Not Participating in NATO

Neutrality in the global perspective is leading to isolation. Isolation, especially for the small nation means possible backwardness while having no influence on international affairs. Regional as well as global security can be increased only by participation. Therefore, leaving Latvia and two other countries outside NATO is a mistake that will lead to the decrease of security in the region.

Followingly, the decrease of the Baltic international security will inevitably lead to the domestic instability. Three countries with population of around 8 million will interpret the denial of their participation in the NATO in 2001 as repetition of history of 1939 when Germany traded with USSR territories which did not belong to neither of them. And in this case it doesn't matter if this interpretation is correct or false. It would have real consequences because important is not what is truth but what people think is truth.

In the case that the Balts will not be invited to participate in NATO in November 2002, it will be interpreted as a betrayal by the West. The common argument will be that despite of shared values we will never be treated equally. Consequently, the scepticism of the Western-Latvian cooperation might increase within the Baltic population. Also the fear of Russian dominance will inevitably increase.

As a result, Latvian domestic politics might become less tolerant and less keen to integrate the Soviet era immigrants. Scepticism about EU integration might increase. At the same time it will definitely be followed by increasing Russian political and economic pressure on the Baltics. In the long term, losers of such scenario will be not only the Baltic nations but the region as whole.

Positive Aspects of NATO Membership

The Baltic countries have deserved their NATO membership because of moral as well as rational arguments. The Baltic countries are among the most successful among all post-Soviet nations. They have succeeded in establishing free market systems and stabilizing their democracies. The value system of the populations could be described as Western. As a proof, I have to mention those large envelopes with thousands of drawings that the Latvian children were sending to New York children after the terrorist attacks on the Twin towers. Latvians are not seeing themselves as a free riders of security system either. The army is small but quickly developing and regularly sending their representatives to peacekeeping missions in the hot spots of the globe.

As far as opponents of the Baltic NATO membership are concerned I see no valid argument on their side. If only we do not agree that our neighbour has something to say once we are deciding to marry our fiancée. "Russia might not like it" argument seems to me equal to another argument. Namely my neighbour is telling me not to marry because he does not like my fiancée. I would like those who agree with neighbour's right to choose my wife or husband to rise hand.

On the opposite, I could offer several arguments why the Balts should be NATO members. First, it would drastically increase domestic stability in the countries. Investors would see this region as secure for their investments, while Latvians, Estonians, and Lithuanians would feel no more fear of bordering Russia. Ethnic integration of Soviet immigrants would speed up, because the newcomers would see the Baltic countries as permanent, stable states with advancing economies.

Second, in the long term the relations between the Baltics and Russia would improve. Russia would drop the idea of controlling the Baltic region and will focus on morally equal relationship. Support for ethnic Russian radicals in the Baltics and opposition to the social integration process in Latvia and Estonia will cease. In turn, the Baltic countries will be more willing to support the process of democratization in Russia. Latvia has a good experience of transition itself, and I believe there is a need to share this experience with Russians. There are no more ardent supporters of the Russian reform than its Baltic neighbours whose vital interest is to see Russia as democratic and prosperous neighbour.

Third, because of the improvement of the relations between the Baltics and Russia, as well as the Baltic integration in the NATO, the cooperation between the North European countries will become more easy. In turn, it will help this region even to increase its vitality economically, socially and politically. Eventually, the consolidation of the region will be reached when the Baltic nations will join European Union but Finland and Sweden possibly enter NATO.

Forth, Latvians together with Estonians and Lithuanians are and will be continuing strengthen the transatlantic link between Europe and North America. Because the security of the North Europe is unimaginable without strong US involvement and it mutually enriches the global cooperation between smaller and larger global nations.

I would like to end up my small presentation with two arguments. First, never in history Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania have felt so secure as now. It is time to institutionalize this security and make it irreversible. Second, I believe it is not anymore discussion "if" or even "when" the Baltic states will be accepted as full members of NATO. Rather it is already a new question: "How will we make our common institution NATO function most efficiently on behalf of our people and global security?"

A LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE

Aurimas Perednis

Let me thank for the invitation and the opportunity to appear before you today.

I will start with unheard-of outrageous attacks in America and the implications they could have on the Baltic dimension of the next NATO enlargement. Strategic environment is dramatically changing. "The terror against US are likely to have far-reaching implications for every aspect of US Strategy", Dr. J. Gedmin wrote in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. The acts of terror against America will focus US attention and resources on defending the American homeland and people. Issues such as Macedonia and engagement in the Balkans generally are now likely to fade on the U.S. screen. Even the next round of NATO enlargement may find itself pushed aside on the American agenda.

During his visit to Vilnius, Dr J. Gedmin from *New Atlantic Initiative* said that to secure the continuation of NATO enlargement we have to "put the idea of NATO enlargement into the minds of George W. Bush and Condi Rice". They have to "get up and go to bed" with this idea on their minds. Unfortunately, today, they fall asleep with other ideas on their minds.

Second, Russian-NATO relationship went through an earthquake. NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson said for Italian Newspaper *La Repubblica*: "We have never been so close to each other". Ideological disparities step aside for pragmatic politics. Immediately after the acts of terror in the U.S., Russia expressed its support for America. Nothing allies people and states more than the existence of the common enemy. Former enemies consolidated their efforts in the fight against international terrorism by launching consultations on common measures to fight terrorism and exchange information. No doubt, the U.S. is eager to learn from the experience and intelligence information gathered by Russia during the war in Afghanistan. I fear that Russia will not give it for free. Opportunities for new deals are opened. The U.S. has two projects to sacrifice: (1) Missile Defence; (2) the Baltic States' membership in NATO.

It would be academically vicious to ignore another possibility of development, which should not be rejected in a world undergoing dramatic and fundamental changes. I have in mind very lucid words by NATO Secretary General in Sofia that the anti-terrorist campaign will not affect the expansion of NATO. One may not confuse these things. It seems absolutely feasible that with the formation of an anti-terrorist coalition, the export of security frontiers by extending NATO frontiers will be particularly important.

Speaking about the Baltic dimension of the next round of NATO enlargement I want to point out that whenever we start debating about NATO enlargement to the Lithuania, the issue of Kaliningrad enclave comes up. We cannot forget

Russia because of Kaliningrad enclave. But "the population of the Kaliningrad region will not feel any insecurity after Lithuania gains membership in NATO", said Mr. Nikitin, Chairman of the Kaliningrad regional Duma during his visit to Vilnius. This is an indication that Lithuania's membership in NATO worries the Russian political elite and the generals rather than the public at large.

While visiting Moscow on 31 January 2001, Governor of the Kaliningrad region Mr. Yagorov met Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to discuss the future of the region after Lithuania becomes a NATO member, and the region appears surrounded by NATO and the EU. This shows that Russia is trying to put up with the changed security situation and eventual membership of the Baltic States in NATO.

Another myth popular in Russia describes NATO as a military machine of the Cold War times. "NATO is about the guns, not about the values" is a popular saying in Russia. Thus, when the Alliance approaches Russian borders, Russia will have less security. One keeps forgetting that Russia's borders with Norway and Poland are the most stable. Even Russia's military doctrine states that the main threats to Russia are posed by the East and the South.

Here, again, one could recall the words of a popular Russian foreign policy expert S. Karaganov that the issue of NATO enlargement is not related to increased military threat to Russia. NATO doesn't pose any military threat to Russia, however, through NATO Russia is eliminated from the development of the environment of European security and from decision-making.

I believe that the problem stems from the fact that Russia still cherishes hopes to restore the hegemony it once possessed in the Eastern part of the continent. One could easily find politicians who speak about this quite openly.

Let us imagine a situation that the Parliament of Lithuania enacts a law providing for social guarantees to militaries performing their service and special tasks on the territory of Russia. Even discussions on a law like this seem to be impossible. Nonetheless, such a law still exists in Russia. Although, due to the warfare in Chechnya the law has been amended several times, the name of the Baltic States stands out already in its title.

Russian diplomacy gave an equally rude slap in the face by publishing, on the eve of the visit of the President of Lithuania to Moscow, an open declaration of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in four languages stating that the Baltic States acceded the USSR voluntarily and according to treaties complying with the international law.

Today, the issue of Russia's membership in NATO can be observed coming up in discussions. I represent Havel's school, thus, I think that talking about Russia's membership in NATO, as it is now, is unreasonable. First, Russia still suffers from the deficit of democracy. Russia has not, and in near future will not, implement a single criterion set by NATO. Second, NATO missions, like those in Kosovo, will become impossible, as Russia will have the right of veto.

However, the world changes 10 times faster than 15 years ago, and never say never.

Before concluding, a few words about membership of the Baltic States, which, in my opinion, will be predetermined by three key factors: 1) our preparedness, 2) the strategic benefit the Alliance will get from our membership, 3) our contribution to the creation of security in Europe and ability to share common responsibility.

Today we observe the growth of support to our membership in Washington D.C.. There, political and moral reasoning prevails over military arguments. I hold the view that the accession of the Baltic States, in essence, is a moral imperative to the authors of the strategic US foreign policy. "Doing what is right" is an important part of the US political culture. Last summer George W. Bush speaking in Warsaw, with an evident reference to the Baltic States, said that enlargement might not stop due to geographic or historical reasons. Russia has no veto right in that respect.

We know that the enlargement is sure to happen in 2002. The only question is whether it will be symbolic or substantial. Slovenia and Slovakia are secure candidates. Their accession improves the geography. However, this is only a tactical step. It is the trends of the development of international policy rather than our intentions that will influence the victory of "symbolists" or "substantialists".

SWEDEN: STILL THE ODD MAN OUT

Ann-Sofie Dahl

As we speak, there seems to be a good chance that all three Baltic countries will make it into NATO after the Prague summit next fall. The idea of inviting just one Baltic country, presumably Lithuania, to start negotiations for membership was gradually abandoned during the course of the year 2001. As the Republican former chairman of the Senate's Foreign Relations' Committee, Jesse Helms, convincingly argued at a speech at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC in mid-January, it is indeed "the right thing to do." By many Republicans, and the new administration, Baltic membership is presented in very strong moral terms. So did President Bush during his visit to Europe this past summer.

Baltic membership in NATO is also supported by the Swedish Social Democratic government, though not as part of its official policy, not in public, and not in so many words. Prime Minister Persson might have become somewhat intimidated by the strong reactions to his blunt initial statements with regards to Baltic security right after arriving to office in 1996. "The Baltic cause is our cause" he then stated, causing a minor crisis with his own Foreign Ministry and creating a temporary breach with the much more cautious formulations issued from those quarters.

But the early statements by the PM showed the right instincts which Persson – a novice in the field – often manifests when it comes to foreign and security policy. During his tenure, and most specifically in the last few years, we have witnessed a growing gap between the "old" and the "new" schools of thought on international relations within the Social Democratic government and party. Prime Minister Persson's pro-Western, pro-American – even pro-Israeli (as shown by the Holocaust conferences organized by the government) – views are in stark contrast with the radical positions which dominated policy in previous decades. In particular, it is a very significant departure with the Palme tradition in foreign policy.

The presence of the "new" school has been especially noticeable after the tragic events of September 11. Though still adhering to an official policy of nonalignment, there has been no neutral ambition, no attempt to argue the merits of both sides as was the case during the Gulf War, when then-Prime Minister Carlsson offered his mediating services to the warring parties.

Ten years can obviously make a lot of difference: in the fall of 2001, a historic coalition emerged in Parliament between the government and the Non-Socialist parties (the isolationist Center party included) as they joined forces in declaring Swedish support for the US right to self-defense against terrorism. A new dividing line was drawn between on the one side these major parties, and on the other, the former Communists, now the Left party and the

Environmentalists. At the Social Democratic Congress, also in the fall, the Persson position, favoring an active Swedish stance in support of the US, won a politically crucial debate against a small but vocal group of left-wing internationalists, sceptical of the US and arguing a more radical Social Democratic position.

In those ten years, Swedish policy has also moved from its traditional focus on the Third World to the Baltic Sea region. This was originally the result of the very active interest for the Baltic cause by the Bildt government, and the personal involvement by the then-Prime Minister himself, but the region has since remained the undisputable center for Swedish policy which it is still today. When approving of the idea of Baltic membership, and agreeing that for the Baltic Sea to be surrounded by NATO countries would indeed be beneficial also for nonaligned Sweden, the Social Democratic government now finds itself in the somewhat contradictory position of supporting NATO membership for the three Baltic countries while rejecting it for Sweden itself.

But then again, when it comes to Swedish security policy it has always been wise to separate what's being said from what's being done. The major difference today is that the public now has full access to information on what is being done: that was not the case during the half century when elaborate schemes of secret cooperation rendered Sweden the nickname as the Alliance's "17th" member at NATO HQ.

Sweden is still engaged in close cooperation with NATO, though now in the open through the Partnership for Peace program. Some of this is being done with its nonaligned Nordic partner, Finland, and much of it in the Baltic Sea and the Balkans. Both partner countries are seen as valued "security producers", rather than belonging to the more extensive category within the PfP of "consumers" of security.

However, the rhetoric emanating out of the government buildings in Stockholm suggests a different picture. Prime Minister Persson has repeatedly stated that Sweden will "never" join NATO – even though that is hardly for him to decide solely by himself, nor can he expect to "always" hold on to power or to control the process indefinitely.

Swedish membership in NATO is actually on the agenda of only one single party in Parliament, the liberals (Folkpartiet). Contrary to the belief of many, membership is not actively pursued by the Conservative (or Moderate) party. Though the membership issue has received a political upgrade in the last two years since Carl Bildt handed over the party chair to Bo Lundgren, the position of the party is still that membership should be an option for Sweden in a vague and supposedly rather distant "future".

But then, what will happen if the three Baltic countries do join NATO? Will Finland follow suit – and then what for Sweden? Would a position as truly an outsider in the region and in Europe – the odd man out – still be seen as providing advantages for Swedish security and regional stability? Whatever

government would be in power at the time would quite quickly become acutely aware of the substantial lack of political influence from which Sweden would suffer when everybody else in the neighborhood is a member of the same organization and alliance. This would be similar to the situation in 1991, when Sweden, seemingly overnight, decided to apply for membership in the EU as the economic and political consequences of being on the outside suddenly dawned upon the Carlsson government.

Perhaps we would see the surface of "the reverse Finnish argument" in such a situation: during the Cold War, one strong argument in favor of Swedish neutrality was that it served to strengthen Finnish security and sovereignty. But if Finland follows the Baltic example, the reverse might become true: Sweden might then actually be "forced" to join NATO as well as a result of Finnish membership in the Alliance, with the security of the two countries seen as so closely intertwined.

But so far, the Swedish government refuses to abandon the main argument now being used against NATO membership; that Sweden has to remain nonaligned in order to be able to pursue an active internationalist policy in the world. However, the many activist countries within NATO – such as Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway – prove this point to be both irrelevant and invalid.

At some point, Sweden undoubtedly will have to start moving beyond the present position and revise that sole remaining argument after a close look at reality. It might be hard to believe right now, but even for die-hard nonaligned Sweden it might after all be a matter of not if but when it too becomes a member of NATO.

DISCUSSION

Summarized by Karoliina Honkanen

The “position papers” were followed by a lively debate on several themes ranging from enlargement to more general questions on NATO’s role. The topical question of the fight against terrorism tended to reappear in almost every theme.

First, the discussion revolved around Finland’s and Sweden’s possible membership in NATO. It was asked whether Finland may expect more surprises from Sweden. The EU case is well remembered in Finland: Sweden applied suddenly without informing Finland. It was suggested that perhaps this time the order could be reverse; Finland would join NATO first and thereby put pressure on Sweden to join, too. It was also remarked that Finland and Sweden will be the “odd men out” in Europe, if they continue their policy of military non-alignment, and such a Europe would be a very odd Europe.

Another major theme was, not surprisingly, NATO-Russia relations. It was asked how NATO enlargement could be sold to Russia. Several observations, comments and suggestions were offered. It was emphasized that the enlargement will proceed and Russia will not want to do anything against its own interests. Also, it was pointed out that the Baltic States are not a threat to Russia, but the threats come from elsewhere. Attention was drawn to the OSCE principle which confirms every country’s right to join security organizations. One Workshop participant perceived that there are differing values and perceptions in Russia and the NATO countries. On the positive side, it was noted that there are new chances for cooperation after September 11.

It was pointed out that it is also a question of *how* the enlargement is done. It was suggested that it is now time to improve cooperation with Russia, as the 5-year birthday of NATO-Russian partnership will be next year. Especially, practical opportunities for cooperation were called for.

One of the main themes in the discussion was NATO’s role in the war against terrorism. A delay in the enlargement process was considered possible. Also, it was argued that NATO’s role as a serious military organization is put into question because its military role in the US operation is not important and because the US learned from the Kosovo experience that wars cannot be fought with Allies. However, many of the Workshop participants did not accept this view. First, it was pointed out that NATO was completely unprepared for this kind of situation and therefore this should not be taken as an indication of how NATO will act in the future. It was believed that the Alliance will find a more permanent role in the fight against terrorism. Secondly, it was considered most important that NATO did act and invoke Article 5 rapidly after September 11. Thirdly, it was argued that the current situation only reflects the different

ways in which individual allies react; some are willing to do the hard work. Fourthly, it was noted that the expectation must be that the US as “*primus inter pares*” will take a bigger role in situations like this.

The issue of globalizing NATO was also raised. It was asked whether NATO could become a global security actor and engage in action with partners like Australia or Japan. It was pointed out that the US had expectations of a changing role for NATO, and now it was time to rethink the Alliance’s role.

It was also asked what kind of a NATO the aspirant states want to join – is it the “old” NATO? In their “position papers” the panelists had presented different views on whether NATO is primarily a political or a military alliance. It was pointed out that the partners and future members are not only looking for NATO’s security protection, but also want to take part in decision-making and bear responsibility. Moreover, NATO membership was considered a question of identity; a way of returning to Western civilization.

On a more general level, the new international order was discussed. The question was whether there is a contradiction between national interests and common values. The views were divided. On the one hand, it was argued that there is no contradiction between them. Especially after September 11, national interests are more and more common interests. On the other hand, it was considered that there is a trend towards national interests and geopolitics. In this latter view, a key question is whether the US wants to defend its interests through NATO, unilaterally or through *ad hoc* coalitions.

EU ENLARGEMENT WORKSHOP

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“Position papers” by: Niels Helskov
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Hanna Ojanen
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WHAT THE SECURITY IMPACT OF EU ENLARGEMENT IS IN THE BALTIC

Niels Helskov

To Denmark the basic concept of the EU is that it is a "peace project". It is a general endeavour to make conflict or war impossible between its Member States. The EU has succeeded beyond our greatest expectations. We have with the EU had 50 years of peace, freedom and prosperity in Europe.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall we now have a unique possibility of overcoming the division of Europe by enlarging the EU with the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland and the three Baltic States. To Denmark enlargement is a show of solidarity with the candidate countries, but in our view also the best possible investment in the long-term safety and security for all the involved countries and their populations.

When we talk about "security impact" I think we should view "security" in a very broad sense. It spans from conflict prevention and crisis management to consolidation of the market economies, the protection of the environment and the rule of law as well as the development of democratic institutions. The European Union has a great responsibility to ensure peace, stability and development in Europe. It was the primary motivation behind the founding of the European Community, and it will remain the prime aim in the future. The end of the Cold War meant new challenges and opportunities for the EU. It paved the way for the enlargement. Today we have the possibility of creating a strong, united and stable Europe.

The accession negotiations are difficult in themselves, but give the EU and the applicant countries a possibility to assess how far they have come on their road to integration in the European structures. It is a unique instrument in planning in common and giving impetus to progress in national priority planning. And the enlargement process has already contributed to the political stability, economic progress and social justice in the applicant countries.

Denmark never recognized the absorption by the then Soviet Union of the three Baltic States. To us the present enlargement negotiations are a way of overcoming the mistakes of the past. As to Poland it is one of our closest neighbours, and we relish in the thought that now all of our close neighbours in the Baltic will become EU members.

It is the Danish ambition to finish the historic circle – a decade in the European peace project: From Copenhagen to Copenhagen. By that I mean that at the summit in Copenhagen in 1993 the enlargement process really got started, and now we hope to see the conclusion of the negotiations with the first group of candidate countries to the EU at the EU-summit in Copenhagen in December 2002.

The enlargement will be costly, but we are ready to shoulder that burden. It will also necessitate many changes in the way the European Union functions. But in our view it is our moral obligation towards our new democratic neighbours to welcome them in the EU as quickly as possible, and then to make the necessary adjustments in our own working methods.

The transition period will last years, but the net result in our view is an enhanced security for all. Both for all the EU Member States, including the new ones, but also for the non-EU States in Europe, as the stability, predictability and the economic viability in the expanded EU area will be enhanced. This is even more true of the situation in and among the states around the Baltic Sea.

THE SECURITY IMPACT OF EU ENLARGEMENT IN ESTONIA

Liis Klaar

Estonia has applied for membership in both European Union and NATO. As we say, these are the two sides of the same coin. EU membership will give us the soft security and NATO the strong security.

We started negotiations with the EU on 31 March 1998, since then, we have resolved 19 chapters. During the Chair of Belgium we hope to close further 6 chapters.

Estonia has promised to be ready end of year 2002 – the question remains if the EU is ready for us? As soon as Estonia has a positive answer from the EU that we are accepted, we will have a referendum. This will of course be a challenge for our government, but this has been promised and will be carried through.

Currently 27% of the population are clearly for and 24% are against. The majority of the population has not decided yet. (These are the figures from June 2001.) Curiously, the same investigation showed that when the people were asked about their opinion about the EU 78% either had no opinion or found EU rather positive. Most positive factors were education, overall economic development, employment and security.

One of the reasons why so many people hesitate is the feeling that the EU is something foreign, something far away. Do not forget that Estonia was a closed society and especially the middle-aged and elderly people have not been able to travel and see Europe. They do not have a feeling of what Europe is like.

On the other hand, Estonians have always regarded themselves as Europeans and one of our famous poets and great thinkers Gustav Suits said already before the Second World War – “be Estonians, but become also Europeans”.

Of course, almost 50 years of Soviet occupation has altered the thinking somewhat. Today’s Estonians, who have been ruled by Moscow, are somewhat afraid of now being ruled by Brussels.

It is now up to us, our government and our politicians to make it clear, that there is a big difference. In Brussels we are sitting at the same table as all the other member countries. We can contribute with our points of view, with our thinking and at the same time, we can take the good ideas from other member countries back home.

All the emotional thinking that we are loosing our language, our culture and so on, can be turned around, saying that we are bringing our language and our

culture to Europe – Estonian will be one of the languages used in the European, as is Finnish today.

My personal point of view is also, that although our macro economy has been successful, it is the micro economy that affects our people. Somehow we have to improve the living conditions of the poorer, elderly, less educated people on the countryside – these are the ones who are mostly against Estonian membership in EU.

The people in Estonia are also pretty negative to the ruling government and the parliament. There is a feeling of a wall between the acting politicians and the people – “they do not do what we want; they are too far away from us etc”.

This is in a way true – we do not have everyday contact with our voters, we try to pay more attention to that, but there is also an explanation, which also goes for Latvia and Lithuania. In order to meet all the rules and regulations of the EU we have to improve and re-do the whole legislative system. In Estonia we have processed 1780 laws in the last 8 years. This is a tempo which is incredible and of course there are mistakes made, which have to be repaired and that takes even more time. This is not an excuse but perhaps an explanation why our parliamentarians just do not have very much time to meet the public.

When we are back to normal, it is to say, we are members of the EU these relations will certainly change to the better.

I mentioned Latvia and Lithuania. One of the questions put to me has been – should all three states get the membership in EU at the same time and what will happen if not.

My personal view is that the best solution will be all three together and in the first round. If any of us have to wait for the others and will be moved back because of the others, then every state should be taken in on its own merits.

This goes for the EU and for NATO: membership there is only one way – ALL THREE TOGETHER.

The second question that comes is – what about Russia? The answer is that our membership in the EU does not change our relations to Russia. Russia is our neighbour, it will not move and neither will we. We want to achieve normal friendly relations with all our neighbours. But Estonia is a sovereign, independent state and has the right to apply membership in organisations, which are good for the people who live in Estonia.

The events of the 11th of September in New York and Washington have shocked the world and have certainly changed it. We are watching the new close friendship between Russia and the USA with a bit of scepticism and with the knowledge that every deal has a price. The question is what is the price?

Ladies and gentlemen, the price cannot be a new Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, where the three Baltic states are going to be exchanged for something that Russia wants to achieve. Or is it even so, that not even the three of us are the “exchange money”, but only Estonia and Latvia. Somehow it seems to me, that there has been a tendency to isolate Lithuania and to screw up the national feelings in Estonia and Latvia and mark us as “bad boys” again.

My hope is, that the members of the EU will act independently, they are welcome to Estonia and ask our Russian minority, how they feel and why they do not want to return to Russia as suggested by president Putin.

Estonia has adjusted its borders according to the Schengen requirements. The experts have noticed that Estonian borderguards are doing a good job. The terrorism, the drug smuggling and trafficking are global problems, where we all have to act together.

The security impact of the enlargement. First of all, the logic says, that one EU Member State will not attack another member state.

It is also logical, that Europe should solve its own problems without asking for help from NATO, so ESDP is something that is needed. For crisis prevention and civil crises management, Europe needs a common policy. For military crises management, I personally think that NATO is the organisation.

ESDP is still only on the paper – it is voluntary – and rules and connections with NATO have still to be worked out. It is essential not to double the functions.

It is also important to make calculations on how much it will cost to keep it up. The rules for non-member states, but NATO members, have to be defined etc. In my eyes, there are more questions than answers today. It is difficult to be for or against it without knowing the answers.

To conclude, Estonia is ready to be part of Europe and to take the responsibility to keep peace and stability in Europe. To stay as a grey zone between Russia and the rest of Europe is impossible. Estonia is too small as a market and will be influenced from either side. For the peace and stability and democratic values, it is better for the EU to have all the three Baltic States as members. Also the Russians will benefit from it.

A FINNISH PERSPECTIVE

Hanna Ojanen

Finland is a certainly a country that tends to see international cooperation and international organisations in terms of security, and has often claimed that EU membership has effectively strengthened its security. Thus, it is only logical that Finland sees EU enlargement as a way of enhancing security in Europe, and in its own vicinity, and that it furthers the EU membership of its Baltic neighbours so that they, too, could benefit from the security enhancing effect of the Union.

As President Tarja Halonen has put it, EU enlargement makes the continent more stable, more prosperous and more secure, and is, in fact, “at the present moment the most important and the most concrete means of promoting stability, security and well-being in Europe.”² Conversely, and more concretely, it has been noted that any arrangement short of real EU membership would be a risk for stability. As Max Jakobson put it for a year ago, denying EU membership to the Baltic states would mean creating a new division in Europe, a grey zone between the Union and Russia. This would, in his view, threaten stability in the Baltic Sea region and thus imply an indirect security risk for Finland.³ The government report on Finnish security policy of 1997 indeed advocated all three Baltic states joining together for reasons of stability and security; later the same year, however, Finland took sides with the Commission that placed Estonia in the first group of countries.

One problem with the fact that Finland speaks warmly about the EU as a security organisation is that Finland may seem to advocate EU membership as an *alternative to NATO membership* for the Baltic states. Indeed, it actually has done so – seeing that the Baltic states’ NATO membership would be a risk for regional security because of eventual Russian reactions, while a EU enlargement would not be. Obviously, then, this position has at times been interpreted as Finnish scepticism towards Baltic states’ foreign political goals and aspirations; besides, the Baltic countries themselves do certainly not see the two organisations as alternatives, certainly not the EU as a substitute for NATO.

There is, in fact, a strange interplay between EU enlargement and NATO enlargement. Other countries, too, have played that game offering if not the one, then the other; both organisations seem to promote, as it were, the same ‘public goods’ of democracy, stability, and membership in the same club. At times it has seemed that EU enlargement can be postponed if the countries are first taken in NATO – as NATO enlargement is easier to realise. This may give some breathing time for the EU, but confuses the candidate countries. One

² Speech by President of the Republic at a ceremony marking the tenth anniversary of German reunification in Berlin on 2 October 2000. [Http://www.tpk.fi](http://www.tpk.fi).

³ *Helsingin Sanomat* 22 September 2000.

could ask, however, whether these countries need any EU membership once they are in NATO.

Now, however, Finland no longer sees two alternatives but acknowledges the Baltic countries' obvious right to both memberships. It also works for the inclusion of candidate countries in the discussions on the Union's future; it is important that they are present in the future Convention as it deals with their future, too. Yet, while Finland has been officially supportive of enlargement, it has avoided overstated promises. When the Prime Minister noted in Tallinn in May 2000 that Estonia and Hungary are the strongest candidates for accession, and that Estonia is often seen as the first one, the President of the Republic hoped merely a week later in the same town that the Estonians would be patient, noting that the last thing to do is to promise some candidates the right to be among the first to join.⁴ – The Finnish caution is partly based on the fact that Finland's relative position in the Union will, if measured in votes and representatives in all EU institutions, weaken after the enlargement. The caution has been visible in discussions on transition periods as to free movement of labour, where Finland decided for 2 years with possibility for reconsideration (shorter than some other countries, however). As to public opinion, one could note that in May, 53% of the Finns favoured having the Baltic states in the first group to join the EU, but 51% wanted transitional periods for the free movement of labour force.

All in all, even though Finland has in a way been over-emphasising the EU's security political role, it is certainly right in underlining the security political implications of EU enlargement. In the EU, security is a multidimensional thing. Particularly now, when looking at the responses to terrorism, it is easy to see that security in the EU is not only a question of foreign and security policy, but one of all the three pillars together.

What are, then, the implications of EU enlargement for Finland? Once the Baltic states join the EU, they will join all the pillars, but as members, they will also have their say on the balance between the pillars; they will have their particular emphases of their own. The question of what interests and policies the Baltic countries will further in the EU is obviously most interesting.

Enlargement will in some form or another mean increasing regionalisation within the EU. Finland has put effort in further developing Nordic cooperation within the EU, and the next question is whether the Baltic states, or some of them, feel like joining the Nordic countries, and if so, in what questions. Some of their 'relative assets' as members are the same as those of Finland: the Baltic states refer to their good knowledge and experience on Russia and other eastern neighbours, as Finland has done in the EU. Would they have the same views on how to manage EU-Russia relations, to take an example? If common views are found, and the new Nordic club is enlarged to the Baltic, Finland's 'relative position', at least when measured in terms of good friends and neighbours, might be improved rather than weakened after the enlargement.

⁴ See *Helsingin Sanomat* 9 May and 17 May 2000.

THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN UNION MEMBERSHIP ON LATVIA'S SECURITY

Marks Deitons

I will talk about the impact of EU membership on security in the Baltic States and Russia, the status of Latvia's negotiations to join the EU, and the psychology of enlargement.

This is a good time and place to be talking about the state of security in the Baltic States, the Nordic countries, and in Europe.

Finland with its un-allied status, relative neutrality, and attention to preventative diplomacy is a vantage point offering situational awareness without immersion in tragic and distracting realities that engulf so many parts of our troubled world.

What country in the European Union is more democratic, more globally connected, more economically competitive than Finland?

The success of Finland to develop along with the success of other Nordic countries has caused them to become open societies which are not nervous about their identities. The Nordic countries are confident countries.

The Nordics recognize that their future security is linked with a swift and complete integration of their neighbours to the east including not only the Baltic States but also northwestern Russia.

The Nordic countries realize that to integrate the Baltic Sea region fully, attention must be drawn to the region. This requires a flamboyance and panache that is not genetically Nordic.

In Latvia, we seized upon the Northern Dimension early on as a means to achieve more effective utilization of regional potential and to boost cooperation among countries on the Baltic rim.

Still our Nordic friends must haggle with Europeans living outside the Northern Dimension on how swift and how complete the integration of the Baltic Sea area shall be.

Full EU integration is security. Quality integration at the highest speed is also security.

New Risks

Driving home at higher speeds than I would have liked to Helsinki from Riga on Tuesday afternoon, I received the slightly surprising information that our Embassy had been quarantined... along with the Czech and Norwegian Embassies.... for three hours while Helsinki police investigated a sprinkling of suspicious white powder on a nearby street corner.

Usually, when returning to Helsinki, you notice, if you have been to so-called "countries in transition" that you are back in a charmed country, where lost wallets are returned.

I think that I'm not the only one who wishes to turn back the clock; on September 11th some Pandora's box was opened, and we don't know yet how we will deal with the contents.

Though the European Union has not properly managed to control football hooligans and anti-multinationals, the EU ought to be quite well suited to dealing with the job of keeping terrorists at bay, and at locating and bringing them to justice.

Latvia needs security from terrorists and organised criminals but most Latvians probably feel that they need social security even more. Latvia wants the kind of security which goes hand in hand with long-term investments and large scale investments. We need economic security. And economic security always involves a military angle. Investors look to see that their money is safe.

So the EU which began as economic community and NATO which has always been a military alliance are complementary. The EU and NATO are flip sides of the same coin.

This is different from the Finnish perspective expressed well by a Finnish economist working for Nordea. I asked him if he had calculated the costs for Finland to join NATO. He replied without pause to consider, "Why does Finland need NATO?" "We have the EMU."

How will Latvia's membership in the EU will affect its security? It will be enhanced. That is clear. On the other hand, European integration and European security require both the EU and NATO enlargement. They are parallel processes of integration.

Latvia's Economic Situation and the Negotiations for EU Membership

Economically, Latvia is ready for EU membership. GDP growth in the first half of 2001 was over 8.5%. Latvia enjoys the second lowest inflation rate among candidate countries: 1.75% in the first half of 2001. Unemployment is below 8% and falling.

Since the opening of accession negotiations in February 2000, Latvia has managed to catch up with the candidate states that started negotiations in 1998. We have opened 29 chapters, and closed 17. We estimate that we will be closing four to seven chapters by Christmas. We stand behind the principles that each candidate state should be on an equal footing with other candidates and judged upon their own merits.

We plan to conclude negotiations by the end of the Danish Presidency in 2002 and to participate in the European Parliamentary elections in 2004.

Punching Above One's Weight

Other ideas about security and the EU. Security for a small country means punching above its weight. Judging by Finland's example, the EU can offer a multiplier effect for small countries so that they can hold their own on the international stage, exerting influence many times their size.

How Finland has increased its global influence through EU membership appeals to the people of Latvia, and it is our Embassy's job to make sure that the benefits of membership are made known. After a half century of censorship, Latvians want to ensure that their voices are heard in European decision-making.

The EU and NATO are not the only organizations that can be used to wield influence and increase a European country's stature on the international stage.

During Latvia's Presidency of the Council of Europe which was completed this year, we worked toward consolidating the organisation's cooperation with the EU and OSCE on the Balkans and Chechnya, as well as adding two new members – Armenia and Azerbaijan. We held an international conference on the small languages of Europe contributing to the European Year of Languages.

European security is the security of its borders. In Latvia we believe that implementation of joint cross-border cooperation projects with the north-west regions of Russia will contribute considerably to the security and prosperity of

the Baltic Sea region. But we have applied visa free regimes in accordance with Schengen.

European security means aiding democracy, freedom of speech, and political stability in Russia. Security is derived from self-sufficiency and from reliable partners.

Baltic speakers this morning expressed the belief that EU and NATO membership will enhance relations with Russia and bolster Russia's shaky democracy.

Moscow is still refusing to acknowledge that the desire for enlargement of the EU and NATO is demand-driven. The fact remains: the Baltic States cannot be a danger to Russia even if they wanted to be.

Public Opinion and the Referendum on EU Enlargement

A short word on the EU referendum. First, we do plan to have one even though it is not very obviously demanded by our Constitution.

Secondly, the referendum will be successful. Opinion polls show approximately forty percent of the population or more supporting EU membership. Twenty five to thirty percent against it. And the rest undecided. October 1998 gave a preview of what will happen. At that time, Latvian voters were asked to decide on citizenship for immigrants that had arrived during the Soviet occupation. The voters opted for a domestically unpopular solution – citizenship for ethnic Russians. And they did this because they understood the vote to be a vote for the EU.

When looking at the public debate on the future of the enlarged EU in Finland and other EU member states, we see people expressing the same worries that came up during the debate on the vote for accession to the EU. Generally, we can tie the worries about the success of the EU to lack of information and fear of change.

Conclusion

To conclude: the European Union ought to acknowledge more frequently that it is not a stand-alone organization. The EU should say that it needs NATO, and that EU states need NATO. It goes without saying that NATO needs the EU. A strong economy without military security is incomplete. Likewise a strong military without a strong economy is not sustainable.

The world has changed and is changing rapidly. Some political scientists speak so politely. They say "there are no threats to European security, only risks."

“Don’t call it a war against terrorists, better call it a campaign.” And it is kosher to say that we have entered a new era in which cooperative security and multilateralism is triumphing over ad hoc coalition-building!

But human nature does not change rapidly. Human beings are impatient and fearful creatures. Let us hope that on occasions like today, when EU heads of state and government are meeting in *Gent*, and talking politely about risks to the future of Europe, that they are also agreeing that delays in either EU or NATO enlargement will be delays in consolidating the indivisibility of European security.

Indivisible European security is the best antidote to 21st century risks.

WHAT IS THE SECURITY IMPACT OF EU ENLARGEMENT IN THE BALTIC?

Egidijus Vareikis

EU enlargement is a complex issue changing not only the geographical extension of the single market, but also influencing almost all areas of domestic and international policies.

Security was one of the main factors sticking integrating countries together in the early years of European communities. The common foreign and security policy (CFSP) was set not only to make Europe more independent in security area, but also to fill the 'security vacuum' left in Europe after the Cold War. Its objectives include protecting "the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union." The CFSP also emphasises strengthening "the security of the Union and its Member States in all human rights and fundamental freedoms".

Maastricht treaty turned CFSP into reality, and recent years revealed the trend of creation of EU security arrangements semi-independent from other European security structures. EU today is still in a crossroads of determining its own security concept. So-called European security and defense identity (ESDI) has to become the possibility to have the forces applicable in prevention and liquidation of the threats. However, the material shape of European security is still not completed, and it will depend on developments in the EU itself, in NATO and in Europe as a whole. CFSP was not always successful, however it is already the reality of EU life.

There is the common understanding that the EU grants so-called soft security guarantees for its members, tries to increase openness of political environment in its neighbourhood and creates at least part of so-called security community in the region. It has no doubt a positive effect on the security situation, not only to the member countries ("old" and "new"), but to their environment as well. The candidate countries have CFSP as one of their negotiating chapters and completed negotiations in that area successfully. CFSP is the so-called easy chapter, that is the clear signal, that foreign policy and security priorities of candidate countries are the same as the policies of the EU.

There is no doubt that the enlargement of the EU influences and will influence the security situation in the Baltic region. The access to the EU of Finland and Sweden in the Baltic region can be evaluated only positively from the security point of view. Both countries became active participants in EU security initiatives, especially in assisting the Baltic states and in developing the so-called Northern Dimension which deals also with Russian Kaliningrad.

Lithuania as a EU candidate country benefits from the EU now and no doubt its security will be increased after accession to the Union probably in 2004. One can predict that the extension of single market to the eastern coast of the Baltic

Sea will increase the economic stability of the region. The positive development of euro-zone and eventual accession of the Baltic states to that will make the region part of single European economic area with the same security guarantees.

Lithuanian experience of recent years shows that single small and medium size countries are extremely vulnerable facing the crisis in their neighborhood. Lithuania was always encouraged to have the best possible economic relation with Russia and Lithuania did. Its trade exchange in mid-nineties with Russia was the biggest among the Baltic states. However, Lithuania faced most of all difficulties triggered by Russian financial crisis. Lithuania did nothing wrong however was helpless to save some of its profits and markets. It would have never happened if the country belonged to a bigger and powerful union as the EU.

Enlargement of the EU will be a decision that will clarify the relations of the Baltic states and their neighbors. From the very formal point of view Lithuania today has two "sorts" of neighboring countries. Two of its neighbors – Latvia and Poland – are integrating into the Western structures, as Lithuania does. Two other – Belarus and Russia – are not participating in that process at least now and in foreseeable future. The countries integrating now are behaving as future EU members. However, status of transition does not allow them to finalize all their arrangements with neighbors. Thus from the point of view of security enlargement it is a necessary step to implement the positive achievements of post-cold war period.

For Lithuania relations with Russia and its part Kaliningrad are extremely important. In early 1990-ies Lithuania concluded a few significant agreements with Russia, implementing successfully the concept of friendly relations. The transit rules were agreed – the civilian transit was facilitated with abolishing the visa regime for the Russians permanently living in Kaliningrad, from Russian side the non-visa regime for Lithuanian citizens entering Kaliningrad was granted. For the military transit only some lines and under the supervision of Lithuanian officials.

However, entering the EU Lithuania will have to rearrange some of former agreements not only in visa regimens and some transit rules, but also clarify its relations with Kaliningrad. The EU as fifteen and its member states on the Baltic specifically are interested in development of the so-called Northern Dimension – and the specific cooperation with Kaliningrad – to increase the security and cooperation in the region.

The Lithuanian-Belarus border will become the external border of the union, thus, the requirements for the external border will be applicable for it. That will add to the security and stability in the region.

The participation of Lithuania in all other dimensions of European security including ESDI will have its positive impact, making the region more coherent. Maybe the so-called Baltic "special case" will finally be a "normal case".

In this positive development, however, we have to pay attention to the few dogmas concerning the security might of EU integration.

Dogmatic point of view is stating that the economy is primary toward security, and economic interests of EU companies in the Baltic region will push them to give security guarantees. This suggests a new dogma that soft security can replace hard security and is more important than the hard one. For the politically sensitive regions soft security is preferable softening the political tensions. As it was stated the countries will participate as well in CFSP and ESDI. It creates lot of new opportunities. However, it will not guarantee full security satisfaction.

European security plans are related to preparations to face new security threats. It became extremely actual after recent events in New York and Washington. However, there is still much to be done in this area.

The European Union itself is not a security institution. It lacks the instruments of so-called hard security. This requires from the member states or to-be-members that they belong to alliances of hard security or possess strong national defense as a result of long-term tradition of active neutrality. In the Baltic neighborhood we have examples of both – on the one hand, Denmark and Germany are NATO members, on the other hand, Finland and Sweden can be called traditional neutrals. Lithuania and its Baltic neighbors Latvia and Estonia have none of these capabilities. These countries and other Lithuanian neighbor, Poland, are choosing NATO option that is more natural in the post-cold war situation.

Generally it can be stated that EU enlargement increases the security situation significantly. However, it is not universal and not enough. The position of Lithuania as its neighbors as well is that the country has to join both the EU and NATO to strengthen the security of European region, its economy, welfare and values.

Finally, joining the European Union and other European and transatlantic institutions, we have to have our idea on what is the future of European security?

Fukuyama's "End of History" puts emphasis on non-military security matters, such as environment, crime or cultural protection, but our experience shows that it is not enough. Samuel Huntington, in his "Clash of Civilisations", suggests that there will be new patterns of conflict. The Baltic Sea region as a whole and the Baltic States in particular can be understood as a test case for studying these processes. If the successful developments since 1991 will be continued, this region is likely to demonstrate new ways and means for maintaining security.

A POLISH PERSPECTIVE

Stanislaw Stebelski

Why enlargement?

EU enlargement as a continuous process. Four enlargements of the European Union (the European Communities) from six to fifteen Member States have been among the most important developments in its history. Fifteen years after the start of the EC by six countries three new ones joined them in fostering new kind of links on the continent. They were followed by three other countries in two waves bringing about the number of Member States to twelve in 1986. Each enlargement enriched the Union and increased its ability to cope with stability and prosperity challenges in Europe. However none of them contributed to the unity of the whole continent. To the contrary they were reinforcing the political divide of Europe.

Europe united (re-united). It was due to the Solidarity rising in Poland and the following fall of the Berlin wall that the Union could cross the boundaries of Western Europe. Firstly it matured in re-unification of Germany and integration of East Germany with the Communities. The following full-fledged enlargement by three countries in 1995 covered only countries from the West side of the iron curtain. Much more time has proved to be necessary to carry out the opening of the Union to the East, to bring about political and economic unification of the continent.

Political stability and economic prosperity. Expansion of European integration project boundaries beyond its previous limits have been considered both in Member and candidate States as a scenario for promoting political stability and economic prosperity in transforming countries and in Europe as a whole. Before the start of NATO enlargement it had been also considered as a principal way to increase security in Central and Eastern Europe. For the region the European Union represents a model which proved to be successful one in all respects. For applicant countries preparation for membership in the European Union is also a way to define anew their place in Europe and to integrate with world economy.

Europe and Russia. At stake there are also relations with Russia, both of the European Union in a changing Europe, and of the transforming countries aiming at more openness in a more secure environment. On her part Russia is in need of more transparency in European politics and of support to her own reforms. The European Union enlargement seemed to be less controversial development than NATO enlargement from her point of view.

Reinforcing Europe as a world political and economic player. To both sides enlargement of the European Union represents a unique opportunity to increase the role of Europe in world politics and economic growth. New security

architecture in Europe and world has increased expectations that Europe alone would play much more independent role in regional and global politics. Already for some time EU has aimed at matching the increase in competitiveness of American and Asian economy. The transforming countries plagued by crisis situation looked for ways to come back on the path of growth.

EU enlargement vs. enlargement of NATO. Almost from the beginning countries of Central and Eastern Europe have looked at EU and NATO enlargement as mutually reinforcing processes. Much more hesitation appeared on the Western side with respect to both processes. It was coupled with vigorous anti NATO enlargement campaign by Russia.

Lessons from past enlargements

Within divided Europe and under NATO umbrella. Starting with European Coal and Steel Community for almost forty years European integration had developed within divided Europe and under NATO security umbrella. Until mid-90ies with only one exception all other 11 Member States were at the same time NATO Member States. European Community was mainly an economic project with limited involvement in political events.

Economic and political enlargement, crossing of religious borders. Therefore economic considerations laid at the basis of the first enlargement in 1973. In the case of following enlargements an increasing role was played by political factors: strengthening of democratic regimes, integrating non-aligned countries with Western structures and increasing their sense of security outside NATO. The latter benefited directly from changes in Central and Eastern Union. In no enlargement, however, the European Union crossed beyond the border of Christian Europe.

East Germany integration. The reunification of Germany represented for the European Union a unique experience of enlargement without normal negotiations. At the same time it was a first step beyond the iron curtain. For Poland it resulted in direct border with the Union.

What enlargement?

For the first time ever the European Union faces accession of more than four countries. The group of candidates has never been so diversified with regard to their characteristics and preparedness for membership. For the first time negotiations have been started in two groups, i.e. Luxembourg and Helsinki groups. Also for the first time a candidate application to start negotiation has been denied against political criteria. Never negotiation has been held with a divided country and the accession of other candidates has been supposed to become a hostage of that country entry to the Union. And finally there has never been such unclear situation how many candidates will be admitted in the first group. Regardless how many countries will be admitted in the first group the Union will eventually expand to Central and Eastern European countries thus eradicating the consequences of past divisions.

When enlargement?

It has been for many years that applicant countries have been engaged in preparations for membership. In the case of Poland preparations were started at the beginning of 90ies with associations agreement. In 1994 Poland submitted application for membership. Like other applicants she was asking for clear time perspective of accession process. Berlin summit in its Agenda 2000 decision established a financial framework of accession. But it was only in Gothenburg last June that candidate countries have been presented with a time-frame of admission of best prepared countries before the elections to the European Parliament in 2004. Taking into account the forthcoming developments in the Union it seems that this will be the only one enlargement before 2006-2007. However, it is very important that new members take part in next institutional reform and financial perspective considerations with full rights. Otherwise it would look like rearranging house without new tenants.

What after enlargement?

What EU? Each enlargement increases the Union and diversifies it. It is in each case a plus-sum game. The same will be the case with the next enlargement. Already now the Union gains substantial political and economic benefits from the accession process and preparations for membership by candidate countries. They harmonise their foreign and domestic policy with that of the Union. They have opened their internal markets to Union goods providing it with substantial surplus in trade exchange. They guarantee good and stable profits on invested capital. Enlargement will even increase these gains.

Reform of EU. But enlargement also needs adaptation on the Union side: policies, institutions, finances. The Union has to make the room for new members and they should have the voice in shaping the reform. In no circumstances it should bring about different categories of members.

EU-European integration, Russia. The Eastern enlargement of the Union poses a question of new type of relationship in Europe. What is the relationship between the Union development and European integration process. Does the former stand for the latter? It would be highly controversial if we limit European integration process to the EU membership only. What would be than the place of countries still far from or not applying for membership? On what basis would we like to develop relations with Russia?

EU in the world. Also in the global context a successful enlargement will increase the role and position of the Union as a political player and as a competitor with even bigger internal market.

Baltic-internal EU sea; centre of gravity. Speaking about Eastern enlargement one should not forget its Baltic dimension. Soon almost all Baltic region will be part of the Internal Market. Security and stability in the region will be significantly reinforced. In short time Baltic will face an opportunity to become an important centre of gravity of European and world economy.

What, if no enlargement or enlargement is postponed? No enlargement at all seems to be an unrealistic and dangerous scenario. However, there still exist threats that it could be postponed. Politicians of Member States bear primary responsibility that sentiments of fears do not overwhelm attitudes to enlargement in the Union. Negative attitudes there translate into doubts prevailing in societies in candidate countries that they are not wanted second-class newcomers. Any longer postponement of enlargement will mean lost opportunities and could play destabilising role for Europe as a whole.

Poland on its way to the European Union

Government priority. For all nine Governments in Poland since transformation started integration with European Union has represented one of its priorities. Last and this years the outgoing Government has speeded up preparations for membership. We expect a good account of that in the forthcoming regular report of the Commission. Up to date 17 negotiating chapters have been closed. The new Government intends to further advance preparations and negotiations for membership so that Poland is ready on 31 December 2002.

DISCUSSION

Summarized by Terhi Suominen

The debate started with active discussion and with important questions. The debate showed clearly that the two enlargement processes, EU and NATO enlargements, cannot be separated. So although the topic was EU enlargement we were discussing much about NATO and NATO enlargement as well.

*EU Enlargement isn't anymore a question of if. It is a question of **when** and **how**.* There is still a great deal of unresolved problems in the EU enlargement that should be taken seriously but after all we came into the conclusion that in the end EU will resolve them.

The workshop was mostly dealing with the next questions during the whole debate:

1. First of all we were discussing about the *EU enlargement process* in general. When and how the enlargement is going to happen? What if a candidate country's referendum is negative etc.? What kind of impact the enlargement has on EU decision-making?

EU enlargement was mostly seen as a political question. We had a discussion about the big bang and what does it mean. It was seen as a bang including all negotiating countries minus Bulgaria and Romania. We agreed that the applicant countries have done a lot of job and expectations are high at this time. According several participants it has been a hard school of being a candidate country and the enlargement process has become far more a psychological question for the applicant countries.

2. Secondly we discussed *the emerging situation between the big and the small states in the EU*. Which are the national interests of the big states in the EU? Do they differ from the interests of the small states? We came to the conclusion that the gap between the big and the small states will burst out especially with the enlargement of EU and especially in the security dimension.

3. There was lively discussion about *the NATO membership, about neutrality and non-alignment*. First of all NATO was seen as a question of security identity for the EU applicant countries. Also the role of non-aligned EU countries was found interesting. Question, why Finland and Sweden do not want to join NATO whereas Baltic states are eager to join NATO, arised active debate. In a nutshell we agreed that the main reason for that is that for non-aligned EU countries, in this debate Finland and Sweden, EU is just enough. They don't feel any need for stronger security whereas the Baltic states want the hard security which they cannot find joining only EU.

The transatlantic relations, relations between EU and NATO, are going to play very important role in the future. This link has also influence on the EU enlargement process while after next year NATO is going to enlarge. NATO is enlarging in the same area where EU is enlarging. Next year the Prague summit will show the direction of the process.

We had also a good debate about the new “softer” role of NATO and a good question was asked: who needs the EU-bureaucracy in Brussels if membership in NATO is achieved? In other words, will the aspirant countries, especially the Baltic states, be interested in the EU after joining NATO?

4. Also the *question about European identity* was taken into the discussion. In this period of time when the support of Europeans in the EU could be stronger the question about European identity is relevant. Now we have 15 members but after the EU enlargement there might be nearly 30 member states. Without getting the Europeans more involved in the EU process how can the idea of united Europe survive in the long run?

5. The impact of EU enlargement on Russia *was also discussed. The impact of 911 was seen essential in the relations between Russia and EU. Now Russia is closer to Europe than ever in the post Cold war world and it has changed the reaction of Russia to the EU enlargement process.*

6. There was also intensive debate about the *question of Cyprus*. Everybody agreed that that question will be extremely difficult and should be discussed and resolved.

NORTHERN DIMENSION WORKSHOP

Chairman: Ambassador Jaakko Iloniemi

“Position papers” by: Raul Mälk
Ari Heikkinen
Valdis Krastiņš
Giedrius Čekuolis
Chris Prebensen
Andrzej Jankowski
Yury Deryabin
Bo Hugemark

AN ESTONIAN PERSPECTIVE

Raul Mälk

Northern Dimension is now an established, working element of co-operation between the EU and its partner states.

Estonia supports the interim report which was adopted by the EU Gothenburg Summit, and in particular, the specific proposals for increasing the efficiency of the Northern Dimension. We think that it must concentrate efforts on a smaller number of priorities in the future. Estonia notes a good progress in environment co-operation.

The forthcoming Danish presidency in EU is very important for the future of the Northern Dimension. Candidate countries must take active part in preparations for action plan for period after 2003.

We also support the aims and measures, which were presented in the action plan adopted by the Nordic foreign ministers 9 April 2001. It is important that selected projects must reflect the interests of a region as a whole.

Estonian priorities are a development of IT co-operation, of the Baltic Ring energy programme, and the Nordic Gas Grid project.

Estonia is a leading country in the Northern Dimension programme. In the Action Plan, which was adopted by at the ministers' conference in Riga 28 September 2001, we see the priorities as e-Government, e-skills, e-commerce, e-science, and IT security.

Another success was the Northern Business Forum, which was organized by the Swedish and Estonian Foreign Ministries, in Tallinn, 4 April 2001. We consider public-private partnership as an important part of Northern Dimension activities.

Estonia considers the role of regional organizations crucial for the Northern Dimension.

The Council of the Baltic Sea States could support such activities as a cross-border co-operation programme, which would encompass the Russian oblasts of Pskov and Leningrad, would shorten the time required for crossing the border (so that it would not exceed 2 hours), would increase IT co-operation, and would promote the development of rational and environment-friendly maritime transport in the Baltic Sea.

A FINNISH PERSPECTIVE

Ari Heikkinen

The Northern Dimension was introduced a few years ago with an aim to build a more comprehensive approach for the EU-Russia cooperation in the Northern Europe. The European Council in Feira in June 2000 adopted the first Northern Dimension Action Plan and the concept has now become an integral part of EU's external and cross-border policies.

The purpose is to enhance political stability and economic prosperity in the area by using the existing financial resources and institutions. In addition to economic and trade cooperation the Northern Dimension focus is on "soft security" issues like nuclear safety, environment, communicable diseases, fight against organised crime etc.

The objective is also to prepare the Union and the Baltic Sea region for the next round of enlargement. Through the membership of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland the Baltic Sea will become an internal waterway of the Union and Kaliningrad, as we all know, will become a Russian enclave inside the EU. Second enclave after Switzerland.

From the outset Russia was meant to be the main partner in the Northern Dimension policy. This was only logical since due to the accession process the Baltic States and Poland were already considered to be among the EU in formulating external relations vis-a-vis Russia.

When we launched the Northern Dimension we wanted to get the EU to think more about Russia and Russia to think more about the enlarging EU in the new geoeconomic situation enfolding in the European North. EU-Russian relations should not any longer be seen in a geographical or political vacuum, but rather in a context that includes other countries in the region as well. Key word here is economic interdependence – particularly in the field of energy.

In fact the Northern Dimension has changed the EU-Russian agenda to a great extent. Before the concept was introduced in 1997 very few EU member states were aware of the Baltic Sea Council or the cooperation in the Barents region. Arctic Council sounded even exotic to southern EU members. Most of our EU-colleagues were unfamiliar with the problems of nuclear waste in the Kola peninsula or with the deteriorating public health and HIV/AIDS development in the area. These and many other issues of "soft security" nowadays occupy the EU-Russian agenda.

Since the then Prime Minister Putin's visit to EU-Russia Summit in Helsinki in October 1999 Kaliningrad has been discussed almost to an exhaustion. The EU and the Russian Federation are now approaching a stage in their dialogue where very concrete issues concerning the Kaliningrad oblast will be

discussed. There is a need to find practical solutions to questions like visas, transit, environmental regulations and energy supply, so that there wouldn't be unnecessary new barriers for free movement of people and goods in the Baltic Sea region.

We should not, however, forget other Russian regions as well. It would be actually interesting to hear from our Russian friends whether the Northern Dimension has encouraged Russia to think more on regional terms in her external relations, and whether a kind of mirror approach for the Northern Dimension could be worked out for the Northwestern regions from Pskov to Murmansk.

In Finland we have 10 years of experience in dealing directly with the Russian regions under an intergovernmental agreement and the results are promising. It is important to note that Russia and Lithuania have together worked out two so called Nida initiatives with very much the same purpose, that is to enhance cross-border cooperation with concrete measures. This is exactly the purpose of the Northern Dimension, to encourage all actors to innovative and constructive policy-making and leave aside the old-fashioned geopolitical thinking.

At this point somebody always asks, okay, the political objectives of the Northern Dimension are nice and supportive but what about concrete projects, where are the major oil and gas pipelines?

It would be easy to avoid this question by distributing the thick project lists the European Commission prepared for the Helsinki and Luxemburg Northern Dimension Ministerial Conferences. These documents and bilateral reports show that the EU member states and the Commission have put a lot of financial resources to projects and activities in the Northern Dimension area. In fact, the amount of EU's technical assistance from the TACIS-programme to Northwestern Russia has doubled since the Northern Dimension policy was adopted.

Instead of speaking about these project lists and the difficulties to concretise the Northern Dimension I think we should again emphasise that the Northern Dimension is not and should not be an instrument through which the EU would allocate automatically more tax payers money to NW Russia or anywhere else unless the conditions for investments are met. It would be accordingly unrealistic to expect the International Financing Institutions to change their financing policy just because of the Northern Dimension which is, by definition, a political recommendation.

Finally, I would like to pay your attention to two very important and concrete decisions the EU and the IFI's have taken with respect to environmental sector of the Northern Dimension.

- First, the decision by the EU Summit in Stockholm in March this year to give, for the first time a mandate for the EIB to extend financing (under certain conditions) for selected projects in Northwestern Russia.
- Second, the decision by the EU Summit in Gothenburg in June to establish a Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (Fund) for environmental projects in NW Russia.

A Northern Dimension project that has relevance for the both above-mentioned decisions is the South Western waste water facility in St Petersburg. Finalisation of this project should convince the last sceptics that the Northern Dimension works also in the real world and not only as a political brand.

In closing I would say that the Northern Dimension has become an integral part of the EU-Russian agenda and next year, during the Danish EU Presidency, further decisions should be taken to continue the policy beyond the year 2003.

A LATVIAN PERSPECTIVE

Valdis Krastiņš

I would like to start my short intervention on personal level: I remember very well the excitement in Latvian government circles when we first heard about Prime Minister Lipponen's presentation of Northern Dimension draft project at Rovaniemi, September 1997. The excitement, I am sorry to say, primarily was a negative one, because in the first draft which came our way, we could not find a mentioning of Baltic states, and we naturally saw ourselves as active future players in this project, loath at being treated as outsiders. At that time I was acting as an Ambassador-at-large for my Prime Minister and got sent promptly to Helsinki to find out privately and discreetly the details. Counsellor Timo Pesonen was ready to meet me on these terms, and on a Sunday afternoon in one of the nice Helsinki coffee houses he explained to me the sum and substance of his Prime Minister's bold vision. At the same time I received assurances to be brought back to Riga about the involvement of my country in the project.

What has changed in the Northern Dimension since autumn 1997? I shall mention first of all the complete involvement of Latvia in the project. We have a special committee on governmental level under the chairmanship of our Prime Minister for the Northern Dimension, and our position is spelt out in great detail in the form of a position paper, from which I should quote some lead paragraphs:

Maybe the most important even in the development of Northern Dimension has been the adoption of Northern Dimension Action Plan at the Feira European Council in June 2000. For us it has been a very significant turning point: we have been with the Northern Dimension from the very beginning, but now, after Feira and at the same time Latvia being on its way to be a member state, we see the Northern Dimension not only in the present but also in future tense as a guideline to future cooperation in the region.

The Feira document has been called by its creators a "political recommendation to be taken account by relevant actors whenever appropriate". Obviously it is not a very forceful wording, and unhappilywise the role of the main bodies (CBSS, Barents Council and Arctic Council) in the region has been reduced to "identifying common interests in the region". Practically these weak formulas have been at the core of disappointments and delays in involving Northern Dimension for projects which inevitably need an organizing, directing center. Hesitancy in creating new institutional structures for Northern Dimension has been an obstacle in accomplishing more in the field of concrete results. There are tasks – for instance getting the resources, bundling them together and then channelling them into a definite project – which are difficult, not to say impossible, to accomplish without an active, motivated central force. I personally am full of admiration for the vision and especially for the tenacity

needed to make this vision an accepted EU action plan with an accepted action plan, but am still doubtful about the practicalities. To leave the Northern Dimension action plan in the hands of European Commission without a special body boosting the interests connected with it means that this action plan is now a part of the general EU battlefield of national and group interests competing for attention and EU financial resources. That may explain why comparatively few projects, which have been mentioned here today, have attained maturity phase. But I am sure that in the future, when the number of “relevant actors” will grow as a result of accession by interested parties – for instance, the Baltic states – the chances for activities in the Northern Dimension will increase. There is absolutely no need to be pessimistic about the Northern Dimension or to abandon it; an enlarged EU is not thinkable without interest groups and a kind of regionalization. It may very well be that in the long run the Northern Dimension will turn out to be one of the really big ideas for the region.

THE EU NORTHERN DIMENSION – A LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE

Giedrius Čekuolis

Continuous European and Transatlantic integration provides unique opportunities for creating stability and well being in the Northern Europe and around the Baltic Sea in particular. It is recognized that the Baltic Sea region has enormous potentials and these are: rich natural and human resources, highly skilled labor force and its high-tech orientation, excellent transit opportunities and conducive investment environment. Almost 300 million of population in total inhabits the states sharing the shores of the Baltic Sea. The Baltic region has become a laboratory example to other parts of Europe for promoting closer regional co-operation and as a test case for the Western approach to an undivided Europe. It is very concrete and simple calculation – this region will become a key to the European Union and Russian relations.

The real necessity to create closely linked entity of states belonging to different levels of economic development and to different European structures – EU, EFTA, CIS and countries candidates to the EU – was the basis to the originally Finnish idea. During the Presidency of Finland to the EU the idea to involve deeper European Commission into the Northern European matters has been realized.

The Swedish Presidency of the EU gave the new impetus to the idea and at the Second Foreign Ministers' Conference on the Northern Dimension, organized in Luxembourg in April 2001, participants gave broad political endorsement to ongoing work for the Northern Dimension Initiative and welcomed new ideas which at the later stage were included into the Conclusions of the Chair. It is difficult to expect the same level of attention to the Dimension during the Belgian and Spanish presidencies, but it is worthy to be mentioned that we have high expectations during Danish Presidency of the EU in the second half of the year 2002.

It should be stressed that the Northern Dimension has developed into an effective tool to enhance the co-operation in the Northern region of Europe. The impact of the ND on stability in the area was stressed not only by EU members or partner countries – Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland and Russian Federation, but also by the different countries not directly related to the initial meaning of the region, including United States of America.

We could see especial value of the ND Initiative for the tasks of the practical integration of the candidate countries of the region into the EU structures. In this context, we could see special role of the regional organizations – the Council of the Baltic Sea States for example – in the implementation of the Action Plan of the Northern Dimension. We highly welcomed the initiative of the German presidency to draw up a list of regional priority projects, giving the possibility for countries of the Baltic Sea region to express their views on the

co-operation within the EU Northern Dimension Initiative. It is very important now that Russia accepts the challenge to implement the Action Plan and Lithuania is looking forward to the Presidency of Russia in the CBSS in this context.

The Action Plan for the Northern Dimension covers a broad range of sectors. The Feira European Council in its conclusions specifically mentioned three priorities: environment, including nuclear safety, the fight against international crime and Kaliningrad. Integration of environmental concerns into different sectors of economic co-operation is an overall objective of the ND and with enlargement, the Union's responsibility for the environmental condition of the Baltic Sea region is increasing. The EU is playing a major role in the region on nuclear-related problems and this is especially seen in Lithuania. The EU activities in support of nuclear safety so far mainly focused on reactor safety (the Ignalina, Leningrad and Kola Nuclear Power Plants) and on the decommissioning of Unit 1 and Unit 2 (at the later stage) of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant.

Concerning the fight against Organized Crime and Justice and Home Affairs it is important to continue and develop ongoing activities within the framework of the Task Force such as measures against trafficking in human beings, illegal immigration, stolen vehicles, money laundering, smuggling of high taxed goods and corruption. In line with the conclusions of the Tampere and Feira summits, more attention is being paid to migration issues, such as readmission, visa and asylum matters, to the financing of border control posts, and to improved border management.

The Kaliningrad issue in the context of the Northern Dimension is very important for Lithuania. While recognizing that primary responsibility for the development of the Kaliningrad region lies with the Russian federation, the Kaliningrad region deserves special attention due to its geographic location.

Regional and cross-border co-operation with Kaliningrad directly concerns several Partner Countries. The Nida and Nida II initiatives regarding Russian-Lithuanian co-operation on Kaliningrad, also involving Poland, is a good example of how Partner Countries directly can contribute to the implementation of the ND Action Plan. Lithuania and Russia submitted 5 joint updated priority projects on the co-operation with Kaliningrad from the "Nida Initiative" in the meeting on the Northern Dimension Initiative on April 9, 2001 in Luxembourg. Those projects are: construction of transport corridor "Via Hanseatica"; modernization of transport corridor 9D; deepening of the mouth of the Nemunas tributary the Skirvyte river; project for specialized AIDS prevention centre with the branches in Klaipeda and Kaliningrad and joint training programmes for border and customs officials operating on the Russian-Lithuanian and Russian-Polish borders.

Lithuania welcomes the fact that Kaliningrad is on the EU enlargement agenda. However, this issue and related decisions are not and must not become a condition to the EU enlargement. It is an issue to be tackled in order to multiply

the benefits that enlargement will bring to the region. Even geographically it is a special case which might need special decisions. The solutions are to be sought from various sources, including the Communication of the European Commission on Kaliningrad published on 17 January 2001. This document to a large extent reflects Lithuanian position towards Kaliningrad and degree of co-operation in relations with Kaliningrad. It is joint agreement between Lithuania and Russian Federation to stress the issues of synchronization of TACIS, PHARE and INTERREG in implementing common projects. During the visit of the President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus to the Russian Federation on 28-30 March 2001 it was agreed: to stress the issues of synchronization of TACIS, PHARE and INTERREG in implementation of the common projects; to stress mutually the issues of fund-raising for Northern Dimension projects; Kaliningrad region should be seen as an opportunity and not as a problem.

The importance of co-operation with the Kaliningrad region in the framework of the Northern Dimension Initiative was stressed during the meetings of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and for Co-operation of the Nordic and Baltic States (NB - Eight format).

Lithuania is one of the main trade partners and investors in the Kaliningrad region. We co-operate successfully in environment and health protection areas. The contacts between parliamentarians and NGO are maintained. Lithuania is training administration officials and businessmen of Kaliningrad. This autumn we shall have European Days in Kaliningrad.

Free movement of persons is the most sensitive issue. Together we have to discuss how introduction of visas would and could influence the development of the Kaliningrad region and its relations in wider region, and find solutions. Two principles are important: 1) control of borders and movement through the borders, 2) openness of Kaliningrad for cooperation.

Lithuania is situated at the crossroad of two very important transport hubs and the increasing attraction of the region opens even more opportunities. The focus area for the future economic development from Lithuanian perspective could be seen in the development of the common regional infrastructure projects. The Northern e-Dimension offers a platform helping to accelerate the transition into the information society in the region. The creation of the Common Baltic Electricity Market as well as the establishment of power transmission links between the states around the Baltic Sea, the transport corridors such as Via Hanseatica and Via Baltica for the road and Rail Baltica for the railroad transport are to become the priority areas not only for Lithuania. This is the future of the region and this should be reflected in the next Northern Dimension Action Plan.

Now I could tell the open secret that the main threat for the very idea of the Northern Dimension Initiative is the lack of finances for the projects already included into the ND Action Plan. The clear financial schemes how to finance the programmes and the projects were not established at the very beginning and we couldn't see financial institutions ready to take this burden. The

European Commission is also not willing to allocate additional funds for the implementation of the Action Plan.

I have mentioned five joint Lithuanian-Russian projects included into the AP but the latest evaluation of the implementation of those has recovered very sad picture: the projects are implemented mostly on Lithuanian side and financed by Lithuanian Government. We could foresee an essential problem in the closest future – the lack of positive examples of the project implementation could devalue the very idea of the Northern Dimension Initiative.

THE NORTHERN DIMENSION IN THE EU SOME ASPECTS OF INTEREST IN THE HIGH NORTH

Chris Prebensen

Nordic Security has seen many changes in the last 10 years. Peace operations, disaster relief and soft security have become major factors in the security dialogue. Since 11th September the co-operative effort against terrorism is becoming a first priority.

But we see that non-military issues such as social, economic, political and environmental threats can be just as large a security challenge as a military one. The Petersberg declaration of 1992 incorporated many of these soft security definitions including social and economic differences, environmental issues and the fight against international crime.

These views on soft security were incorporated into the programmes/agenda for the Council of the Baltic Sea States in 1992 and the Barents Council co-operation in 1993. Both take up the non-military challenges facing the two subregional structures. This extended security concept gave the basis for the further work in these subregional structures.

The Finnish initiative in 1997 to get EU focus on the activities in Northern Europe through the Northern Dimension initiative was an excellent idea. The policy was developed through the EU machinery and ministerial meetings in 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001. The six areas identified were energy, trade, transport and telecommunications, health, environment and nuclear safety and cross border co-operation.

If I understand correctly it was the conscious decision by the Finns not to seek a separate budget line in the EU at that time so as to get the political support necessary. This means that the action plan has a major weakness in that it does not have an established financial basis. The Russians are very keen on a fixed budget for the programme to succeed while the Finns see the Northern Dimension more as a political umbrella for the activities happening at a lower level. At the moment the Northern Dimension in Russia can only qualify for EU funds earmarked for external relations and not the far greater resources available in the enlargement programmes.

The Northern Dimension was developed in the Finnish and Swedish presidencies drawing on the experience of the Baltic Sea and Barents Councils. It was natural that we have an emphasis on soft security issues. The EU did not have a clear security policy line at the time.

At the EU summit in June 1999 EU approved a strategy for co-operation with Russia and in May 2000 Russia formulated a similar strategy for cooperation with the EU. Both focused on strengthening a strategic partnership and to avoid

new dividing lines in Europe. These must be seen as statements of good intentions from two very different political cultures. One is based on a strong geopolitical view in Foreign Policy, based on the classical doctrine of sovereignty of states, while the other is developing a process of supranationality and the right of the individual where the international community has a right to intervene on humanitarian grounds.

At the most recent EU-Russia summit on 3rd October 2001 it was agreed to develop and deepen the security links between EU and Russia. They will follow up the present anti-terrorist strategy. There will be common meetings in the EU Political and Security Committee and there will be a closer relationship between Russia and the EU military and civil crisis management Systems. They foresee joint action to "forestall and prevent" an execution of terrorist activities. This potential for co-operation in the security field, post 11th September, could have far reaching consequences.

Going through the report published in early 2001 by the semi-official Russian Council on Foreign and Defence Policy on "What are Russia's interests in Northern Europe" we get a clear impression of the Russian wish to develop this regional co-operation with the countries of Northern Europe within the concept of the Northern Dimension. They see the potential of this regional co-operation as a way to develop good co-operation between EU and Russia. A multilateral co-operation with these countries in Northern Europe is seen as a significant component in the European Dimension of Russia's foreign policy. The degree of Russian participation in the Northern Dimension will depend, in their view, on the possibilities to solve concrete regional problems, in the first instance economic ones.

As a source of inspiration, but also of further co-operation under the umbrella of the Northern Dimension two subregional structures are of interest. The Council of the Baltic Sea States was established in 1992 with Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Germany and the EU Commission. Its main focus has been democracy building, economic integration and development, education, environmental and energy, nuclear safety, health and combating crime.

It has developed into a useful network forum. The Nordic Council has financed the establishment of an energy centre in connection with the Secretariat of the Council in Stockholm. Work is going forward with developing a better integrated regional energy system covering gas, electricity, climate and energy economy. The Council's Commissioner for democratic institutions and human rights has also done important work. Co-operation in combating crime has also given results. Recently a special group has been established on Norwegian initiative to combat diseases such as HIV/Aids and tuberculosis.

Other speakers will focus more on developments in the Baltic region so I will be looking more at the High North.

The other subregional organisation of interest in this context is the Barents

Council established in 1993. It was originally established by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the EU Commission. They established a council at national level, which has a large number of observer states, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Germany, UK and the US. Of special interest has been their Regional Council which is made up of the political and administrative leaders of the 11 counties, län or oblasts, in the four participating countries, Russia, Finland, Sweden and Norway. It covers 5,1 mill people in an area of 1.326 mill km².

What has been particularly successful has been a reliance on the local structure to identify and implement projects. There is also a close co-ordination between national and regional levels. Furthermore, they have a budget with which to plan. Projects can be quite small, but they are usually guaranteed at the local level. NGO's and local organisations are involved. This has resulted in extensive networking by all professions and a strong feeling of ownership to the projects in which they are involved. In the period 1994-2000 there have been around 800 small and middle-sized bilateral Russia Norwegian projects, which have received support. The success has been the mix of local, regional and national cooperation.

For the years 2000-2003 there are four target areas. Welfare/culture. Competence/Education. Indigenous Peoples, Economic development/Infrastructure and Environment/Health. Since Sweden and Finland joined the EU the number of multilateral projects have increased. Access to EU interregional programme has been useful. Contacts in all the countries have been north-south so most means of communication go that way. Special effort is needed to open up or reopen many of those routes which were active in earlier times east-west but also open up modern electronic communication.

The development of EU's Northern Dimension is of great importance for the further development of Northwest Russia. It is therefore logical that the Baltic Euro Arctic Co-operation and the Baltic Sea States co-operation is used actively in implementing the action plan. In the High North there are many projects of a bilateral and multilateral nature with security overtones, which over time will have an influence on the Northern Dimension initiative.

On the Russian-Norwegian border where the difference in standard of living is among the highest in the world the social and economic challenge is particularly high. These differences need to be reduced. Health, welfare and prosperity is dependent on finding ways to co-operate so solve the most urgent issues. The security of nuclear installations I and the storage and handling of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste has needed urgent attention. It needs a concerted effort with considerable international resources over a long period of time. Just to mention some examples: secure the Nuclear Power plant on Kola, decommission 80 nuclear propelled submarines of which 70 still have their spent nuclear fuel rods in them, securing the spent nuclear fuel from the ice breaker fleet and the naval ships of the Northern fleet. There are around 51000 spent nuclear fuel elements stored of which 21000 inadequately stored in the

Andrejev Bay area in the Lirsa fjord 60 km from the Norwegian border. There has also been an urgent need to construct cleaning and storage for liquid nuclear waste, a vessel for transport of nuclear waste and railway cars for its transport to the Maya reprocessing plant.

Norway has had an active programme with a reasonable budget since the early 90ties to tackle some of these issues. Co-operation has been sought from the Nordic Countries, France, Germany, The Netherlands, UK, US and the EU Commission. It is being pursued in close co-operation with local regional and national Russian authorities. We have had constant problems with Russian bureaucracy, from customs claims on equipment and have been greatly hindered by military suspicion. In some cases this is changing to the better.

The Barents Sea is one of the most bio-productive seas in the world. It is of great importance to the population of Northern Norway and North West Russia, but also to the rest of Europe as a source of food. Annual export of 1 to 2 million tons of fish from the area has a value of about 10 to 20% of the Norwegian oil and gas revenue. By 2020 fish farming can increase production by 5 to 6 times and will seriously compete with oil and gas in value. The Barents and Kara Seas are so far the cleanest in the world but with a great potential for being polluted.

Energy developments in North West Russia are very promising. The Stockman field is the largest field with 2500 billion cubic metres of recoverable reserves. A plan is being developed to bring it to the European market pipeline. Another pipeline project is the Yamal Europe. Other pipe lines to Europe are also being studied. The Timan-Pechora oil development is also a major development. The initial shipment is planned by small tankers with transshipment to larger tankers possibly in Pechenga. In environmental terms this gives reason to worry both for exploration and transport in a very sensitive area. Recent decision by the Russian Duma to allow for the transport along the Northern maritime corridor of nuclear waste to be reprocessed at the reprocessing plant in Mayak in Siberia is an added worry. We see conflict of interest.

Another development is the statement by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that the Arctic is getting warmer and sea ice is diminishing. One result is a more violent climate. Climate change and airborne pollutants such as PcBs has also had an impact on the whole food chain in the Arctic where indigenous people are exposed.

With the central role that geopolitics have in Russian perceptions the relationship to Norway, Denmark and Iceland will often be a reflection of Russia's relationship to NATO and indirectly to the United States. With a stronger development of an EU Security and defence policy to which Russia will relate, this becomes a framework within which the Northern Dimension will develop.

The Northern Dimension area cover at present and in the future most of the area where EU and Russia have a common border. The regional approach is

seen as the potentially best framework for developing EU-Russian relations and there are some special areas of Interest such as the strategic energy partnership, environmental co-operation and clarification of the “Kaliningrad dilemma”.

A POLISH PERSPECTIVE

Andrzej Jankowski

The approaching enlargement of EU by Poland and Baltic States again brought to light the need to intensify co-operation with Russia concerning the Kaliningrad District. Expressing this need early this year the European Commission published Communiqué on Kaliningrad.

Poland also presented the Polish position with respect to this Communiqué. We are concerned about the fact that the future introduction and functioning of the visa regime for inhabitants of the Kaliningrad District should not adversely affect their standard of living.

Poland supports the initiatives to strengthen the development of economic co-operation. In 1999 Poland organized the conference of the ministers of economy and trade from the member states of the Council of Baltic Sea States, during which the issue of eliminating trade barriers in the Baltic Sea Region was discussed.

This problem was tackled by a joint Polish-Lithuanian-Russian initiative to train the administration representatives responsible for customs clearance. In a common training scheme launched 30 -31 October 2001 the Polish side is represented by the customs and border guards. The programme is hoped to facilitate the simplification of the procedures and to shorten the time of customs clearance on the borders of the Kaliningrad District. From the point of view of intensified co-operation concerning Kaliningrad a very significant factor is the international cross-border cooperation.

Better coordination of the PHARE, TACIS and Interreg programmes is of key importance here. In the coming years we foresee the dynamic development of trans-border cooperation between the Kaliningrad District and the neighbouring regions of Poland and Lithuania. Poland counts on the support for this project from Finland and other countries co-operating within the Northern Dimension by means of Interreg programme.

We hope that due to PHARE Cross Border Co-operation Programmes it will be possible to implement initiatives related to transport and communication infrastructure, border-crossing points, ecology, economic development, youth exchange, culture, health care and education. A good example of bilateral cross-border co-operation between Poland and Russia is the developing programme co-operation within the Baltic Euro-region. Due to this co-operation numerous projects concerning education, health care and social welfare are being carried out.

Poland attaches great importance to the development of road and railway infrastructure which is the main axis of Via Baltica Development Zone. We are

aware of the growing significance for southern coast of the Baltic Sea of this pan-European transport corridor leading from Helsinki via Poland to the south of Europe. In the coming years further investments are planned to upgrade the technical condition of the 334 km long Polish section of Via Baltica.

Development of the implementation programmes of the Via Baltica Development Zone is facilitated by the intensified co-operation of the regions of Northern and Eastern Poland with those of Southern Finland. The cooperation comprises also the development of tourist services in the touristically attractive Southern Coast of the Baltic. The tourist cooperation will further be enhanced if in the future it is possible to open the Pilava Strait for navigation of vessels of third parties.

The condition of environment is another crucial factor which has a direct influence on the health level both of Kaliningrad inhabitants and of their neighbours. It is necessary to develop the projects to build purification plants for towns and villages located on the banks of the Vistula and the Kuronian Firth.

We believe that along with the European integration currently going on, there is an urgent need to intensify the co-operation with Russia concerning the Kaliningrad District, in such forms as: the development of transport infrastructure and telecommunications, trans-border co-operation as well as the co-operation in the fields of economy, environmental protection, energy and combating organized crime. Present programme format of Northern Dimension should be broadened by the projects embracing the Southern Coast of the Baltic (including Kaliningrad).

From the Polish side the following regions of Northern and Eastern Poland show the particular interest: Pomerania, Warmińsko-Mazurskie, Podlaskie. They are populated by about 6 mln inhabitants. Together with the Kaliningrad District and Lithuania those regions represent a considerable developmental potential, which should start to be effectively utilized. The accession of Poland and the Baltic States into the EU, closer co-operation with Russia with respect to the Kaliningrad district should be duly reflected in the present and future implementation programmes of the Northern Dimension.

NORTHERN DIMENSION AND THE INTERESTS OF RUSSIA

Yury Deryabin

The new direction in policy of the European Union, which is in many respects focused on an expansion of cooperation with Russia, responds to interests of our country. Its implementation will promote even more active involving of Russia in European integration processes, in cooperation with the EU. It can become the useful additional tool in development of our Northwest and, in the long term, Arctic Region, use of vast potential of these regions, contribute to solution of economic, social, ecological and other problems.

It is necessary to remind that about a quarter of the population of the countries which are included in "Northern Dimension" (ND) and half of their territories belong to Northwest of Russia. In general, after disintegration of the USSR, identification of Russia as a Northern state is occurring. Today North (in broader terms, including also non-European part of the country) covers two thirds of territory of Russia. Though the population in northern regions comes only up to 8%, the Russian North gives 28 % of industrial production and 60 % of the Russian export.

Unfortunately, the realization of "Northern Dimension", though it has already been passed for more than three years, advances very slowly. There are many problems, which should be solved by both the EU and Russia.

Till now, behind some exceptions, the list of the priority concrete projects of cooperation in the frameworks of ND is not agreed or determined. The Action plan for 2000-2003, accepted in Feira in June 2000, and then in addition considered in Luxembourg this summer, carries rather a character of a "good will declarations".

The main question, certainly, is how and where to find sources of financing of the projects of cooperation. According to some Finnish experts, approximately 28 bln. ecu are required until 2020. The international financial institutions (World bank, EBRD, EIB etc.) do not yet show the special activity.

We need a more active use of Structural funds of the EU. It would be expedient to combine sources of the TACIS and PHARE for realization of the transborder projects. Within the framework of the Baltic Development Forum, whose conference was held in September in St. Petersburg, the idea of creation of special Baltic investment bank was discussed. The idea of creation of a special agency for attraction of the investments (some kind of "Venture Catalyst") was also put forward. It is necessary to encourage private enterprises and commercial banks so that they have taken advantage of opportunities of division of risk given by international financial institutions. An example – OPIC, created in USA. We consider that the projects within ND should be open also for the ventures of the third countries.

The basic directions and the spheres of possible cooperation in the frameworks of ND as a whole coincide with interests of Russia. However, criticism was expressed from the Russian side more than once concerning lack of balance in priorities. It seems that for the EU the first priority is to use fuel and energy and other natural resources of the Russian northwest regions. In other words, Russia should also in the future maintain the role of the traditional supplier of raw material for Europe. The industrial, scientific and technical cooperation again remains in a shadow. But our partners should not ignore the fact that our country has kept opportunities to create technology and equipment of the highest international class. For Russia it is essentially important that she is considered as a full equal subject of versatile cooperation, and not just as an object of ensuring needs of the countries of EU for fuel, energy and raw materials.

The economic cooperation in the frameworks of ND must not lead to any preservation of the existing structure of Russian export. The result should be its industrialization with much more accent on industrial cooperation, creation of the appropriate infrastructures. The region should receive outstripping development in technological and industrial cooperation, including on the basis of conversion of defensive sector and joint commercialization of results of scientific researches. But, certainly, in a decisive degree it will depend on Russia, on the further development of her economy.

I should not exclude, that if the priorities of the programs of ND will also in the future be focused on projects connected to export from Russia fuel, energy and raw material, ignoring our industrial and technological potential, than "northern measurement" will lose the positive attitude to itself and interest in Moscow. To sell oil, gas and raw material, even from North, does not in general require some special conceptual or political support.

Since the idea of ND and its prospects are connected with the EU's enlargement (Baltic countries), the development of cooperation in this region will largely depend on achieving favourable conditions; in particular on elimination of trade-economic barriers and measures discriminating Russia. And especially such measures as economic sanctions against Russia for political reasons go against the ND conception as it was seen at the EU Council meeting in January 2000, and affect North-Western regions of Russia.

Analysing Russia's position and possible steps from Russia, it is necessary to avoid wrong ideas and illusions (which exist especially at the regional level) concerning the fact that the EU's initiative is a new programme of assistance to Russia and the EU will be the donor and Russia will be a passive recipient of funds.

The success of ND conception and its potential exploitation for the development of North-West of Russia will largely depend on Russia and not only on its principal approach but on specific measures.

Russia should actively and on equal terms take part in determining some priority directions, strive for its economic, social and other requirements of North-Western regions, the country on the whole being taken into account. And on the contrary, the more completely the conception and agreed projects reflect these requirements, the more actively and fully Russia will take part in ND.

It is necessary to raise the cooperation within ND at the level of federal policy with active participation of North-Western regions taking into account their special position and problems. A number of specific and general questions including law problems are to be settled. Unlike the EU there is no clear regional policy in Russia as well as there is no single conception of transborder and subregional cooperation. The adoption of appropriate laws should be sped up, a more flexible approach is required, for example in the field of customs procedures. It is advisable that a preferential treatment of specific projects within ND connected with the North-West of Russia should be adopted using the experience of Russian-Finnish agreement on cooperation in border regions.

One of the most important problems directly affecting cooperation within ND is an obvious non-distinction of competence between Federal Centre and subjects of Federation in many fields including foreign economic ties and international cooperation. It is necessary to speed up the adoption of basic laws developing the corresponding articles of the Constitution of the Russian Federation that divide the authority of Federal Centre and subjects of Federation on the questions of common competence. There is hope that the administrative reform started in Russia at present will contribute to achieving a clearer system of relations between the Centre and regions and will positively affect ND.

A special attention should be paid to Kaliningrad region which after Lithuania and Poland's joining the EU will become a Russian enclave within the European Union. If no effective and agreed measures are taken, negative consequences for the region and Russian interests in general are possible.

While working out Russia's approach to "northern dimension" it is necessary to use international experience of regional and interregional cooperation wider (the European frame convention on border cooperation, euroregions, etc).

The importance of cooperation between the EU and Russia in the development of north-western regions with their considerable economic potential in the solution of social, ecological and other problems will increase further. It should be remembered that in future "northern dimension" can extend geographically and expand further to the East and cover the whole North of Russia.

At present it is too early to say if ambitious aims of ND will be achieved in full or at least partially. The first political and diplomatic stage of its creation is being finished. Mostly a conceptual basis and a package of basic documents have been prepared so far.

The most important thing in future is to determine and to coordinate specific projects, conditions of their carrying out and, apparently, first of all, finding sources of their financing. It is a long-term and rather complicated process, however, fears shouldn't be overdone. There is hope that "northern dimension" will be carried out and will become a regional reality of united Europe where geoeconomic but not only geopolitical factors will play an ever increasing important role.

THE NORTHERN DIMENSION – SOME SWEDISH VIEWS

Bo Hugemark

The catchword *the Northern Dimension* calls up memories of the Cold War conception of *the Nordic Balance*. Contrary to that, however, the word *dimension* clearly indicates that the Nordic area is only part of a greater context.

To be sure even the so-called Nordic Balance was not an isolated regional arrangement or condition. The fact that it contained, in addition to non-aligned Sweden, Norway and Denmark with their NATO membership and Finland with her friendship, security and assistance pact with Russia meant that this regional balance was only a northern dimension of the Power Bloc and Superpower balances.

This connection also meant that there were scant chances that the non-aligned Sweden would manage to stay outside a major war. This was evident to informed politicians and military, albeit the opposite was pretended in the official liturgy.

However, the Nordic Balance was genuinely believed to play a vital role in the preservation of low tension in the area and thus also to favour détente in Europe. In Sweden the non-aligned policy was thought to be almost a prerequisite for Finland's independence and sovereignty.

After this short retrospect for the purpose of pointing at an important piece of the Swedish security policy legacy I would characterise to-day's official Swedish view on the Northern dimension in four points:

1st there is an echo of the cold war rhetoric in the statement that the non-aligned policy contributes to security and stability in the northern region.

2nd there is a stress upon EU enlargement as the main mechanism for creating stability in the Nordic-Baltic area.

3rd As a base for the first two points there is the premise that no major military threat is discernible in the foreseeable future.

4th Sweden stresses the right of the Baltic states to choose their own security policy line, does not openly support their NATO admission, but does so in practice by assisting them in the build-up of national defence forces.

My own comments to these points:

1st I have never seen any concrete arguments for the notion that non-alignment promotes stability. The only decent argument from the Nordic Balance days – consideration for Finland’s delicate situation – is no longer valid. On the contrary: a non-aligned Sweden today is an obstacle to the security policy freedom of action of the Baltic states and Finland.

2nd The problem with the EU as a security structure is twofold:

- a) There is lacking an explicit security guarantee backed up by credible military instruments.
- b) The EU membership is dependent upon fulfilling of a number of hard economic criteria, a process that can, in adverse circumstances, take a considerable time. As a contrast. NATO membership is subject to security policy and strategic criteria which can be adjusted according to the political will in NATO.

3rd I do not want to conjure up a military threat against the states in the Baltic area. But it would be reckless to rule out such threats and to disregard the historical experience that threats often emerge quicker than the counter-measures. The latter have often been hampered by the fear of “rocking the boat”. Accordingly creating a robust security system should start now, using the window of opportunity in a situation when the process is not aimed at any alleged aggressor.

4th The development of the Swedish military assistance to the Baltic states is very gratifying. However, the best assistance would be a Swedish-Finnish NATO-membership application. As NATO enlarges there is an increasing need to make sure that rim states can get quick support in crisis situations. There should be created “regional branches” with credible forces for crisis prevention and vanguard actions.

A Swedish-Finnish membership would weaken one frequent argument against the admission of the Baltic States: that they are not defensible.

Let me conclude with a historical example of a failed attempt to create a separate Nordic security system. In the interwar years one of Sweden’s principal aims was to prevent Finland from being dragged into a rim state alliance adverse to Soviet Russia or an alliance with Germany. Instead Finland should be part of a Nordic neutral bloc. The political efforts were accompanied by a comprehensive military planning for deployment of the Swedish field army at the Finnish eastern border. That planning may have given Finland – as has been argued by Professor Martti Turtola – a false sense of security. To be sure Sweden saw her policy within the security structure of the League of Nations. That organisation, however, did not possess the ability to take action when a small nation was threatened by a great power.

Today we can only discern one organisation in which a regional sub-system can be securely anchored: NATO.

DISCUSSION

Summarized by Hiski Haukkala

The presentations were followed by a lively discussion. The debate revolved mainly around two major themes: the Northern Dimension (ND) itself and the role of Kaliningrad region in the initiative as well as in the wider EU-Russian relationship.

The problems and weaknesses to be found in the Northern Dimension: Although ND has consolidated its place on the EU agenda, the participants of the Workshop identified problems as well. Conceptually, the Northern Dimension has remained too vague. This is due to a fact that the initiative has been lacking a clear focus and concrete projects that would bear its name. Therefore, some commentators suggested that the Northern Dimension should be turned into a veritable “brand” with projects being realized under its title, even if it means “stealing” some already existing forms of cooperation and “renaming” them after ND.

Another problem identified in the discussion was that the Northern Dimension is lacking in political continuity. It seems evident that the Northern Dimension is highly dependent on the input of individual EU presidencies that are interested in furthering its cause. This leads to a certain fluctuation in the level of political attention given to the concept on the EU side. This is a weakness for the Northern Dimension as it is hampering the development and, consequently, damaging the credibility of the concept, especially in the eyes of Russia but other partner countries as well. There were, however, some dissenting voices arguing that the six-monthly changes are a natural part of the “EU game” as every member state take their turn at the wheel and try to shape the EU agenda more according to their own interests. It can be debated whether the current model represents the most efficient mode of governance, but it has a symmetric nature in it, as other issues, for example, Africa, get equally sporadic attention in the EU.

The role of Kaliningrad: Kaliningrad would seem to be an acute “hot spot” in EU-Russian relations. The debate highlighted the many problems of the region, which is in the near future going to become an enclave within enlarged Union. The main conclusion seemed to be that although there are many problems (for example, the bad socio-economic situation and the effects of the full application of the Schengen regime), the Kaliningrad issues should, however, to a large extent be “de-dramatized”: solutions to the problems are largely technical (requiring the issuing of, for example, multiple-entry visas) and, therefore, relatively easy to agree upon on both Russian and EU side.

To a large extent the keys to solving the puzzle would seem to be found from Moscow: the division of labour between the Centre and the region is to a large extent unfinished business. That is something that will have to be settled before

Kaliningrad (and Russia in general) can be engaged in any meaningful cooperation with the European Union in the matter. It was also stressed that the EU cannot grant any special derogations to Kaliningrad. Individual problems can be tackled but the region must remain within the wider EU-Russian framework.

CHAIRMAN'S ENVOI

Paavo Rantanen

The applause from the auditorium was with good justification directed to Ambassador Jaakko Iloniemi, my predecessor as Chairman of the Atlantic Council of Finland and Chairman of this Seminar. I take this opportunity to thank him for the brilliant work done for the Council. Now, when we have completed our work, it is time to present conclusions. It is not necessary to do it at length i.a. , because you just heard excellent reviews of the chairmen of the three workshops.

To begin, I would like to thank the speakers, panelists and participants of this Seminar, as well as, particularly the chairmen of different sessions. At this stage I dare say that we have had a very successful event, the timing of which was perfect. The aim of this meeting was to get information about the three important issues on our agenda, but also

- learn about national positions and hear personal views on the topics under discussion;
- we have also had some insight on modalities and alternatives for solving these current problems;
- and last but not least, Finnish participants have been able to deepen their knowledge about opinions around the Baltic on these questions.

We have heard the reports from the workshops skillfully presented by the chairmen. I was much interested to hear about the "conspiracy theory", as described by Dr. Sadeniemi, and was fascinated how Dr. Lejins sent the ball back to EU Member Countries, when speaking about the enlargement. Ambassador Iloniemi's review on the Northern Dimension highlighted the many-sided nature of this grand design. All, what we have heard and learnt during these two days, means that we Finns have received plenty of fuel for future discussion about NATO, a discussion, which will be more intensive than until now in the future.

One element has been missing from the Seminar. I mean Germany, country which has been represented here only by a flag. It was due to unforeseen difficulties that we could not have German experts with us. It was a pity, but this will activate us to find out their views on these themes as soon as feasible.

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is now time to give special thanks for Mr. Alan Lee Williams, President of ATA, Dr Jamie Shea and Minister Michael Durkee for their contributions in this Seminar. I also thank the members of the organizing group and those who ran the infrastructure of the event so efficiently. My thanks go also for the sponsors, Nordea and Patria, as well as to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finnish Institute of International Affairs and the Department of Strategic Studies. Thanks to everybody, and bon voyage.

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